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Abstract
Exploring the Impact of Incentives on Management Behavior
Chen Zhao
This dissertation is comprised of three studies that examine the impact of incentives on
management behavior to complement agency problems literature. The first paper studies whether
incentives associated with firm life cycle stages impact management disclosure quality. The
second paper explores these incentives more deeply and investigates whether the likelihood of
fraud is different across life cycle stages. The third paper examines whether rating agencies play a
role in alleviating agency problems in nonprofit organizations by increasing public exposure and
reducing information asymmetry.
Study one examines the relationship between firms’ life cycle stages and disclosure quality.
Life cycle stages are measured following Dickinson (2011), who recently redefined firm life cycle
in terms of firms’ operating, investing, and financing cash flows. The analysis provides evidence
that disclosure quality is significantly different across firm life cycle stages. Specifically, firms in
the introduction, growth, and mature life cycle stages have higher disclosure quality than firms in
other life cycle stages. Another test observes significant differences in disclosure quality within
life cycle stages based on firms’ profitability and size. This study contributes to the financial
disclosure literature by documenting firms’ life cycle stage as a significant determinant of
disclosure quality.
In study two, the incentives associated with life cycle stages are explored to a greater extent,
and this study investigates whether firm life cycle is associated with fraud. According to fraud
theory, incentives and opportunities are important factors that lead to fraud (Dorminey, Fleming,
Kranacher, and Riley 2012). Following Dickinson (2011), this paper uses cash flow patterns as a
proxy for life cycle stages. Firms in different life cycle stages have different combinations of signs
of cash flows, so the incentives and opportunities are likely to be different. Therefore, we expect
that the likelihood of committing fraud is different across life cycle stages. We identify 182 fraud
firms with available data from the AAER database and utilize a 4-to-1 matched sample, as well as
the overall sample in our analysis. The paper finds that introduction stage is positively associated
with fraud, while mature firms are negatively associated with fraud.
Study three investigates whether nonprofit rating availability is negatively associated with
CEO pay-to-performance sensitivity. Prior studies on agency theory suggest that agency problems
exist in both for-profit organizations and nonprofit organizations, and research on agency problems
for nonprofit organizations focuses on the role of nonprofit board. However, some other studies
point out that there are limitations of the monitoring role of the board. On the other hand, donors
provide funds to nonprofit organizations, and they have more substantial incentives to monitor
nonprofit organizations. Balsam and Harris (2014) and Balsam and Harris (2018) find evidence
that donors look unfavorably at higher compensation. Therefore, if monitoring of donors is
available, it is likely that CEO compensation will be lower. Research finds that donors use rating
information to make donation decisions (Gordon, Knock, and Neely 2009; Harris and Neely 2016).
Therefore, charity rating agencies provide a tool for donors to monitor nonprofit organizations.

Using data from Charity Navigator and nonprofit organization tax forms, this study finds that
charity rating availability is negatively associated with CEO pay-to-performance sensitivity for
nonprofit organizations.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Agency theory states that managers might not behave in a way to maximize the welfare of
the principal because ownership and management of the firms are separated (Jensen and Meckling
1976). The firms' owners aim to maximize the firm's value in the long run so that they could boost
their wealth through their holdings, while management are more concerned about their careers so
they may focus on short-term performance or be more or less risk-taking when making decisions.
Practices have been developed to alleviate agency problems. For example, even though owners do
not have direct access to corporate governance, they monitor management behavior through the
board and auditors. Some management behaviors are beneficial to the firms, while others are
unethical and sometimes illegal. Investigating the impacts of incentives on management behavior
is of interest to society because unethical or illegal behaviors can be detected or predicted more
efficiently if these impacts are acknowledged. Therefore, this dissertation explores how incentives
from different situations will impact management behaviors in both for-profit and nonprofit
organizations.
The first paper examines whether disclosure quality is different across firm life cycle stages.
One of the main issues in public firms is information asymmetry between investors and
management. Managers are engaged in day-to-day operations, and they have the best knowledge
of how the firm is operating financially and non-financially, as well as the firm's growth potential
and risks. However, investors do not participate in the firm's operations, and they acquire
information from the analysts and the firm's public disclosures. Even though analysts attend
earnings conference calls and communicate with the firm, they rely primarily on public disclosures.
Therefore, the quality of disclosures of the firm is essential to both analysts and investors. However,
since higher disclosure quality requires management effort (Hui and Matsunaga 2015), managers
may not disclose high-quality information if they do not have incentives. Firms at different life
cycle stages have different characteristics and goals (Spence 1977, 1979, 1981; Wernerfelt 1985;
Jovanovic and MacDonald 1994; Dickinson 2011). Therefore, manager incentives may be
different, and disclosure quality will likely differ across firm life cycle stages. Identifying firm
disclosure quality using life cycle stages allows investors to make better investment decisions and
analysts to provide more accurate estimations.
The second paper in this dissertation studies whether firm life cycle is associated with fraud.
Disclosure quality lies in the grey area of regulation because providing low disclosure quality
might be unethical but not illegal. However, if the firm is facing severe financial pressure,
managers have strong incentives to manage earnings, potentially to the point that they commit
fraud (Hogan, Rezaee, Riley and Velury 2008; Armstrong, Jagolinzer, and Larcker 2010; Koh,
Matsumoto, and Rajgopal 2008). Fraud is a costly problem in the business world, and researchers
have been working to explore how to detect, predict and prevent fraud (Hogan et al. 2008; Bell
and Carcello 2000; Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney 1996; and Farber 2005). However, no prior
research has studied the impact of life cycle stages on the likelihood of fraud. If the incentives
within specific life cycles become strong enough, managers may commit fraud. Therefore, this
paper examines whether firm life cycle stages provide different incentives to managers and
whether the likelihood of committing fraud is different across life cycle stages.
Like commercial firms, nonprofit organizations also face agency problems. Nonprofit
organizations receive funding from donors and government grants. The donors do not participate
in operations, and they rely on the directors of the nonprofit organizations to spend the funding on
1

organization missions. Since the donors are fund providers, they have substantial incentives to
monitor nonprofit organization operations. However, their monitoring role is limited by their
ability to acquire and interpret the information disclosed by the nonprofit organizations, such as
the tax forms. Charity rating agencies provide nonprofit ratings based on the analyses on nonprofit
characteristics, and the rating information is easy, accessible, and understandable to donors. Prior
research also finds evidence that donors dislike high compensation (Balsam and Harris 2014;
Balsam and Harris 2018). donors use rating information to make decisions (Gordon, Evans, and
Nanda 2009; Harris and Neely 2016). Therefore, it is likely that charity ratings serve as the tools
for donors to monitor nonprofit organizations. Results show that rating availability is negatively
associated with pay-to-performance sensitivity for nonprofit organizations, and higher overall and
financial rating scores are associated with lower pay-to-performance sensitivity. This implies that
donors likely play a monitoring role on nonprofit organizations through charity rating agencies.
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ABSTRACT
We examine the relation between firms’ life cycle stages and disclosure quality. We
measure life cycle stages following Dickinson (2011), who redefined firm life cycle in terms of
firms’ operating, investing, and financing cash flows. We find that disclosure quality is
significantly different across firm life cycle stages. Specifically, firms in the growth and mature
life cycle stages have higher disclosure quality than firms in other life cycle stages. Our study
contributes to the financial disclosure literature by documenting firms’ life cycle stage as a
significant determinant of disclosure quality.
Keywords: Disclosure quality, life cycle, analyst forecasts
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Public firm disclosures are under the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulation
and serve as a tool of communication between firms and their investors. Disclosure quality is the
effectiveness of this communication (Hui and Matsunaga 2015). If firm information is disclosed
thoroughly, accurately, and in a timely manner, disclosure quality will be higher, and information
asymmetry between firms and investors will be reduced. The content, accuracy, and timeliness of
disclosures are under the control of management, which has various incentives to manipulate
whether to disclose, what to disclose, and when to disclose specific information to parties outside
the firm.
To further examine management incentives to disclose information, we study firm life
cycle theory to find potential relationships between firms’ life cycle stages and disclosure quality.1
Firm life cycle theory states that firms transition between life cycle stages and experience an
inverted U-shaped curve based on growth, with firms in the introduction and decline stages at the
bottom of the curve and growth and mature stages at the top (Anthony and Ramesh 1992; and
Dickinson 2011). While the general expectation may be for a firm to transition between the stages
in a set order, many factors such as mergers or new product lines may cause a firm to move back
and forth between the life cycle stages multiple times. Given that firms in different life cycle stages
emphasize operating, investing, and financing cash flows differently, their incentives and
subsequent behavior also diverge (Myers 1977; and Jenkins et al. 2004). Consistent with this claim,
Hasan, Al-Hadi, Taylor, and Richardson (2016) find that firms’ tax avoidance behavior differs

1

Following Gort and Klepper (1982), Dickinson (2011) separates the firms into five life cycle stages: (1)
introduction, (2) growth, (3) mature, (4) shake-out, and (5) decline.
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across life cycle stages, while Haribar and Yehuda (2015) document that the mispricing of cash
flows and accruals also differ across life cycle stages. It is also possible that firms’ disclosure
quality is different across life cycle stages, given that firms’ ability to provide high-quality
disclosures and their incentives to do so are likely to vary depending on their current life cycle
stage.
Following Hui and Mastunaga (2015), we obtain disclosure quality residuals from an OLS
regression analysis. The model includes variables that potentially impact firms’ disclosure quality,
and the residuals indicate what is not explained in the model. Because this paper focuses on
management behavior, we follow Hui and Mastunaga (2015) and focus on the disclosure quality
residuals because it represents management’s impact on disclosure quality. We further present how
management’s effect on disclosure quality is different across life cycle stages by showing the mean
disclosure quality residuals across life cycle stages. We also include in our analysis how future
disclosure quality is impacted by current life cycle stages and show the mean disclosure quality
residuals are different for the next coming one and two years. Overall, our result shows that
introduction, shake-out, and decline firms have negative disclosure quality residuals, while growth
and mature firms have positive disclosure quality residuals. The results imply that growth firms
and mature firms have higher disclosure quality than the other three groups of firms. Future
disclosure quality analysis shows that disclosure quality increases one or two years following the
identification of growth or mature firms, and disclosure quality decreases one or two years
following the identification of introduction or decline firms.
This study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, it extends the literature
examining the disclosure quality of U.S. firms. We document that life cycle stage is a significant
determinant of disclosure quality. In particular, we find that firms in the growth and mature stages
8

have higher quality disclosures than other firm groups. Accordingly, our study expands our
understanding of how firms’ incentives to disclose information, based on their life cycle stage,
impacts disclosure quality. Given that disclosure quality affects the accuracy of firms’ valuations,
our findings should be informative to investors and analysts. Even though information asymmetry
between management and parties outside the firm cannot be eliminated completely, indicators of
disclosure quality based on firms’ life cycle stage can help investors and analysts determine how
much reliance they can place on corporate disclosures in their valuation process.
Our study also contributes to the literature examining the interaction between disclosure
quality and cost of capital. Evidence from prior literature indicates that higher disclosure quality
reduces firms’ cost of capital (Botosan 1997; Botosan and Plumlee 2001; Gietzmann and Ireland
2005; Lambert et al. 2007; Francis, Nanda and Olsson 2008). In the context of firm life cycle stages
and cost of capital, Hasan, Hossain, and Habib (2015) find that cost of capital is higher for firms
in the introduction and decline stages and lower for those in the growth and mature stages. Our
results show that growth and mature firms have higher disclosure quality, which corresponds to
the prior literature that there is a negative correlation between disclosure quality and cost of capital.
Our results also have practical implications for financial report users. Research has found
that disclosure quality is associated with analyst behaviors (Lang and Lundholm 1996), cost of
capital (Botosan 1997; Botosan and Plumlee 2001; Gietzmann and Ireland 2005) and litigation
risks (Francis et al. 1994). Research also finds that investors use disclosures to make investment
decisions (Gao 2010) and disclosure quality is associated with stock prices (Easley and O’Hara
2004). Therefore, by identifying additional variables associated with disclosure quality, this paper
can help financial report users make wiser decisions.
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The rest of the paper is presented as follows. Section 2 provides the background of
disclosure quality and firm life cycles. The hypotheses are developed in section 3. Section 4
outlines the sample and methodology. The regression results are discussed in section 5, while
section 6 concludes.
2.0 BACKGROUND
2.1 Disclosure quality
Disclosure quality is generally defined as the effectiveness of a firms’ communication with
investors (Hui and Matsunaga 2015), and disclosures are one of the primary tools for corporate
communications with other parties. Potential and current investors rely on disclosures to make
investment decisions (Gao 2010). As evidence of this, disclosure quality is highly correlated with
stock prices. Easley and O’Hara (2004) find that information from public firms’ impact stock
prices, and specifically, investors demand a higher return to hold stocks with more private
information. Healy et al. (1999) also provide evidence that an increase in disclosure quality is
accompanied by an increase in firm stock returns, institutional ownership, and analyst following.
In their literature review, Healy and Palepu (2001) examine the forces that give rise to a demand
for disclosure and find that information asymmetry and agency conflicts between managers and
outside investors drive the demand for financial reporting and disclosure. Theory also suggests
that higher quality disclosures lead to lower information asymmetry between investors and the
corporation (Lang and Lundholm 1996), making the market more efficient, and resulting in
increased liquidity in equity markets (Welker 1995; Healy et al. 1999; Leuz and Verrecchia 2000;
Healy and Palepu 2001). Prior research also finds that higher-quality disclosures reduce litigation
risk (Francis et al. 1994) and improve investment efficiency (Bushman and Smith 2001; Biddle
and Hilary 2006). Drake et al. (2009) study the mispricing of accruals and cash flows and find that
10

the mispricing is higher for firms with lower disclosure quality, i.e., lower AIMR scores. Overall,
it appears that higher disclosure quality can reduce information asymmetry and can be beneficial
to the market.
In addition to serving as a communication tool, disclosure quality can also impact a firms’
cost of capital. Cost of capital is the rate of return required by investors and is associated with
investing risks (Easley and O’Hara 2004; Lambert et al. 2007). If a firm or project involves higher
risk (i.e., higher volatility in cash flows), investors will require a higher rate of return to offset the
risk, thereby resulting in a higher cost of capital. Prior research finds evidence that higher-quality
disclosures decrease the cost of capital (Francis 2008). Also, using a theoretical framework,
Lambert et al. (2007) prove that high-quality information decreases a firm’s cost of capital.
Specifically, Lambert et al. (2007) use the Capital Asset Pricing Model as the primary model for
firm valuation and find evidence that higher-quality disclosures reduce the assessed variance of a
firm’s cash flow and affect the cash flow assessed covariance with that of other firms. While it
seems apparent that higher disclosure quality reduces cost of capital, prior research has found that
other factors moderate the relationship between disclosure quality and cost of capital. The negative
relationship only holds for specific subsets of firms. For example, Botosan (1997) finds that higher
disclosure reduces a firms’ cost of capital, but just for firms with low analyst following. Gietzmann
and Ireland (2005) control for accounting policy choice and find that the negative relationship
between disclosure quality and cost of capital is only significant for “aggressive” firms (i.e., those
with positive discretionary accruals). In an experimental setting, Barron and Qu (2014) find that
high-quality public disclosures lead to higher price efficiency and lower cost of capital when
information asymmetry is high. Overall, higher disclosure quality is expected to reduce the cost of
capital, but differing firm situations can alter that relationship.
11

Another interesting aspect to consider about disclosure quality is that management
determines what information to disclose. High-quality disclosures require management effort (Hui
and Matsunaga 2015), which means that management incentives can impact disclosure quality.
Hui and Matsunaga (2015) study the impact of CEO/CFO compensation on disclosure quality and
find that changes in disclosure quality are positively associated with changes in CEO and CFO's
annual bonus and that the relation is more robust for growth firms.
2.2 Firm life cycle
Firm life cycle theory suggests that firms transition between different life cycle stages and
the current life stage is determined by various internal and external factors, such as strategy choices,
managerial ability, and competitive environments (Dickinson 2011). On the other hand, the firm
life cycle stage can also impact firms' behaviors because they are under different situations and the
incentives vary. For example, Faff et al. (2016) find that firms make fewer investments and issue
less equity as they become more mature, while debt issuance and cash holding increase in the
introduction and growth stages and decrease in the mature and shake-out/decline stages of firms’
life cycle. Habib and Hasan (2017) study firm risk-taking and find out that corporate risk-taking,
as indicated by a fluctuation of return on investment and return on equity, is higher during the
introduction and decline stages but lower during the maturity stage. Dividend payout activities are
also different among firm life cycles (DeAngelo et al. 2006; Banyi and Kahle 2014), and the
likelihood of firms paying dividends is higher as firms grow. Moreover, Hasan et al. (2017) study
tax avoidance and firm life cycle and find a U-shaped pattern in tax avoidance outcomes across
the various life cycle stages, with introduction and decline firms conducting more tax avoidance.
In addition to the firm life cycle's effect on corporate incentives and decisions, investors’
perceptions and market reactions also differ across firm life cycles. For example, Hasan et al. (2014)
12

find that cost of capital is higher in the introduction and decline stages and lower in the growth
and mature stages. Market-to-book ratio indicates the market’s perceptions of firms’ growth, and
Dickinson (2011) shows that the market-to-book ratio is higher for introduction and growth firms
while lower for shake-out and decline firms. Anthony and Ramesh (1992) also find that the firm
life cycle is a moderator for the stock market's response to sales growth and capital investment.
Firms have different incentives when they are at different life cycle stages. According to
Myers (1977), firm value has two components: assets in place and growth options. Existing assets,
operations, and investments indicate current cash flows, and potential growth options and
decisions impact future cash flows. The combinations of the two variables are different across firm
life cycle stages. For example, introduction firms have fewer assets (Dickinson 2011) but have
more growth options. Thus introduction firms would invest more to capture their growth potentials.
On the other hand, mature firms are larger in assets (Dickinson 2011) but do not have as many
growth opportunities. As a result, firms use different strategies to maximize their value at different
life cycle stages. Moreover, their strategies will impact their secondary incentives. For example,
growth firms need to finance more to meet their investment needs. In fact, Dickinson (2011) finds
that the average leverage of growth firms is the largest among all the life cycle stages, which
indicates larger amounts of borrowing by growth firms. Thus, growth firms have more significant
incentives to lower their cost of capital. Considering this evidence that firms at different life cycle
stages have different motivations and behave accordingly, it is likely that the disclosure quality
among life cycle stages will also differ.
Prior research has found that firm life cycle is associated with financial reporting quality.
Suberi, Hus, and Wyatt (2012) find that mature firms have more persistent earnings. Firms’ beating
or meeting benchmarks behavior is also different across life cycle stages (Choi, Choi, and Lee
13

2016). However, no prior research has studied the impact of firm life cycle on disclosure quality.
Since life cycle is associated with financial reporting quality, it is of interest to study how life cycle
impacts disclosure quality.
3.0 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Disclosure quality is highly impacted by management incentives. Managers can choose to
disclose or withhold information for different purposes. For example, Healy and Palepu (2001)
point out that management tends to withhold bad news in order to attract more investors.
Verrecchia (2001) summarizes what is suggested from prior research that management would
disclose more information when trying to maximize the current market capitalization (Verrecchia
1983; Jovanovic 1982b; Lanen and Verrecchia 1987). Since disclosure quality impacts firms’ cost
of capital, firms with a higher need for financing have more incentive to increase disclosure quality
(Lambert et al. 2007). Beyond financing needs, higher disclosure quality is also associated with
lower litigation risk (Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper 1994) and higher investment efficiency
(Bushman and Smith 2001, Biddle and Hilary 2006). While there are many benefits for firms to
issue higher quality disclosures, managers also have personal costs to provide these disclosures,
including personal effort and the ability to extract rents (Anderson et al. 2009). Because of the
differing firm strategies and goals at different life cycle stages, management incentives will also
differ across life cycle stages.
Introduction firms have a greater need for financing to grow. Pecking order theory states
that firms tend to seek bank debt before equity for financing because of tax benefit (Diamond 1991;
Barclay and Smith 2005). As the amount of debt increases, the pressure from the anticipation of
less liquidity in the future also grows, which leads to underinvestment in positive net present value
projects (Barclay and Smith 2005). However, if introduction firms can lower their cost of capital,
14

the financing pressure can be partially released because their interest expense will be lower, which
also contributes to current cash flow. In fact, Hasan et al. (2015) find that cost of capital is higher
for introduction firms. Prior literature has found a negative relationship between cost of capital
and disclosure quality (Lambert et al. 2007), so it is highly likely that introduction firms would
like to increase their disclosure quality to lower their cost of capital. Our first hypothesis is stated
as follows
H1: Disclosure quality of introduction firms is higher than that for shake-out firms.
Growing firms tend to make large early investments to deter entry (Spence 1977, 1979,
1981) and typically have a high growth rate of sales and net operating assets (Dickinson 2011).
Again, these are firms in need of financing to meet their investment needs. Dickinson (2011) shows
that growth firms have the highest leverage among all life stages. Therefore, lowering the cost of
capital is important to growth firms. Lambert et al. (2007) and Francis et al. (2008) find that higher
disclosure quality reduces the cost of capital, while Kkhurana et al. (2006) and Bushman and Smith
(2003) find a positive relation between disclosure quality and the growth rates of externally
financed projects. Additionally, growth firms shift toward greater transparency and increased
monitoring (Filatotchev et al. 2006), resulting in higher disclosure quality. Prior research suggests
that growth firms have more analyst following (Barth et al. 2001) and are more likely to receive
coverage in the business press (Bentley et al. 2017). Thus information asymmetry about growth
firms is expected to be lower. Thus, our second hypothesis is stated as follows:
H2: Disclosure quality of growth firms is higher than that for shake-out firms.
Mature firms are more profitable and are more likely to pay dividends and do my
repurchases (Dickinson 2011; Grullon and Michaely 2002; and DeAngelo et al. 2006). Since
mature firms are already large in size and operate with profit, these firms do not need to make
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large investments and instead begin to pay off previously acquired debt. Thus, mature firms do not
have a direct need to lower the cost of capital. However, other aspects of mature firms could serve
to increase their disclosure quality. O’Connor and Byrne (2015) provide evidence that firm
governance quality is greatest when firms are mature, indicating that information is likely to be
disclosed in a timely manner. Moreover, mature firms have the highest average age (Dickinson
2011), and with the longer period present in the capital market, news from the firm should be more
readily reflected in the market. Both higher-quality governance and a longer period of operation
could result in higher disclosure quality, which corresponds to Hasan et al. (2015) findings that
mature firms have a lower cost of capital. Therefore, our third hypothesis is stated as follows:
H3: Disclosure quality of mature firms is higher than that for shake-out firms
Finally, firms in the decline stage have negative profits (Wernerfelt 1985). Following the
arguments for introduction firms, the information from decline firms contains more “bad” news
than “good” news. Moreover, Jenkins et al. (2004) find that as firms mature, and especially as a
firm progresses from the maturity to decline stage, the emphasis on profitability increases.
Therefore, it is more likely that the “bad” news might not be disclosed in a timely manner. In
addition, firms in the decline stage are actively trying to survive by selling off investments to
maintain cash reserves and remove unprofitable assets. The focus is likely on staying relevant in
the public eye and continuing the business rather than on providing highly detailed information
about the firm. In fact, management would likely prefer to withhold information rather than present
it to investors resulting in lower disclosure quality. With this in mind, our fourth hypothesis is
stated as follows
H4: Disclosure quality of decline firms is lower than that for shake-out firms.
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4.0 METHODOLOGY
4.1 Life cycle measure
Anthony and Ramesh (1992) developed a proxy for firm life cycle that considers variables
such as sales growth, capital expenditures, dividend payout, and age. By combining the ranks of
these four variables, Anthony and Ramesh (1992) divide firms into three life cycle stages: growth,
mature, and stagnant. This method assumes a uniform distribution of the firm-observations.
However, Dickinson (2011) argues that some performance measures and firm characteristics are
nonlinearly related to firm life cycle. Realizing the drawbacks of using firm characteristics to
identify firm life cycles, Dickinson (2011) developed a firm life cycle proxy based on cash flows
data, which became readily available when the statement of cash flows became a required
disclosure after the sample period used in Anthony and Ramesh (1992). Dickinson argues that cash
flows' signs capture the differences in firm profitability, growth, and risk. Following Gort and
Klepper (1982), Dickinson separates firms into five life cycle stages: (1) introduction, where a
firm introduces a new product commercially; (2) growth, where a firm is in an industry where the
numbers of producers increase dramatically; (3) mature, where a firm is in an industry where the
number of producers and entrants reach a balance; (4) shake-out, where a firm is in an industry
where the number of producers begins to decline; and (5) decline, a firm is in an industry where
the number of entry is zero. The cash flow proxy results in a distribution of firms that is not
significantly different from a normal distribution (Dickinson 2011). Each cash flow can be either
positive or negative, resulting in are eight possible combinations of the signs (+/-) of the three cash
flows. For example, if a firm has negative cash flows from operating and investing activities and
positive cash flows from financing activities, the firm is at the introduction stage. We utilize the
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same methodology as Dickinson (2011) to identify annual firm life cycle stages. A breakdown of
the life cycle stages determined by cash flow signs is presented in Figure 2.1.
INSERT FIGURE 2.1
4.2 Disclosure measure
Disclosure quality indicates firm behavior and is associated with trading characteristics and
analyst behaviors. Prior studies typically use a combination of disclosure or informationasymmetry-related variables to create a disclosure quality index. For example, Lee et al. (2006)
identify higher disclosure quality as having high institutional holdings, low bid-ask spread, and
high analyst following and find that firms with poor disclosure quality tend to report
comprehensive income in a statement of equity and face high cost of transparency. Anderson et al.
(2009) create an opacity index, which includes trading volume, bid-ask spread, analyst following,
analyst forecast errors, and finding that both founder and heir firms are significantly opaquer (i.e.,
of higher disclosure quality) than diffuse shareholder firms. In analyzing firm disclosure practices,
Lang and Lundholm (1996) identified three analysts' behavior variables related to better
disclosures: analyst forecast dispersion, analyst forecast error, and revision volatility. This is
evidence that analyst behaviors are an indicator of disclosure quality. If a firm has high disclosure
quality, analysts will have more consensus in their predictions (i.e., lower forecast dispersion),
information asymmetry will be lower (i.e., lower forecast error), and new information will be
conveyed to analysts in a timely manner (i.e., lower revision volatility). Hui and Mastunaga (2015)
utilize these variables to develop a disclosure index to study disclosure quality and CEO
compensation. Following Hui and Matsunaga (2015), we rank the three variables by deciles in
descending order, add 3 to the sum of the ranking scores, and divide it by 30. This results in a
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disclosure quality index ranging from 0.1 to 1, where higher values of the index indicate higher
disclosure quality.
4.3 Regression model
To obtain management’s impact on disclosure quality, we use the following OLS
regression model, and this model is referred to as Model (1) in this study:
DiscQuali

Where:
DiscQual

=

0 + 1Sizeit + 2MTBit + 3ROAit + 4ROA_Volit +5Lossit+6Analystsit
+ 7Leverageit + 8R&Dit + 9For_Salesit + 10LogSegit
+ 11Shareholdersit + 12ROAit+1 + 13Industry Dummies
+ 14Year Dummies + i
(1)

=

Disclosure quality index calculated by ranking the
forecast dispersion, forecast error, and revision volatility
in descending order, adding three to the sum of the ranking
scores, and dividing by 30;

Size

=

Natural log of total assets;

MTB

=

Market-to-book ratio of equity;

ROA

=

Earnings before extraordinary items divided by total
assets;

ROA_Vol

=

Standard deviation of change in annual return on assets
for the six years immediately before the current year;

Loss

=

1 if a firm is suffering loss, 0 otherwise;

Analysts

=

Number of analysts following the firm;

Leverage

=

Ratio of book value of debt to book value of assets;

R&D

=

Research and development expenses divided by total
assets;

For_Sales

=

Foreign sales divided by total assets;

LogSeg

=

Natural log of the number of business segments; and

Shareholders

=

Number of common shareholders.
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The dependent variable is the disclosure quality index. Following Hui and Mastunaga
(2015), we include in the model the variables that potentially have an impact on disclosure quality.
The variables include firm size (Size), market-to-book ratio (MTB), profitability (ROA, Loss),
operation stability (ROA_Vol), foreign sales (For_Sales), R&D intensity (R&D), total number of
common shareholders and number of segments (LogSeg). Hui and Mastunaga (2015) expect that
firm profitability, operation stability, and operation complexity are likely to impact disclosure
quality. We also include Industry Dummies and Year Dummies controls for the industry effect and
time effect on disclosure quality, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at firm level.
According to Hui and Mastunaga (2015), the residuals of this model are the proportion of
disclosure quality that cannot be explained by these fundamental variables and thus indicate
management’s impact on disclosure quality. Therefore, we compare disclosure quality residuals
across life cycle stages as our main analysis.
5.0 SAMPLES AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS
5.1 Samples
The sample is drawn from the WRDS database. Compustat contains financial information,
which is the source of the fundamental variables that impacts disclosure quality, while the analyst
forecast data comes from I/B/E/S. Since firm life cycle stage is defined using the signs of cash
flows (Dickinson 2011), we extract our sample from the year beginning in 1988, which is the year
that cash flow statement data first became available as mandated by FASB Statement No. 95 (FAS
95). As for the fundamental variables, ROA is the earnings from the current year divided by
previous year’s total assets, and ROA_Vol is the rolling standard deviation of change in annual
ROA for the six years immediately before the current year. For the variables For_Sales and R&D,
Foreign sales and R&D expenses are both adjusted by the prior year’s total assets, respectively.
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Thus, the first six years of observations for each firm are deleted, and the final sample period
begins with the year 1993.This leaves us with 129,475 observations from the Compustat database
for fundamental data. In terms of the I/B/E/S analyst data, following (Long and Lundhulm 1996),
we use the end of year standard deviation adjusted by the beginning-of-year stock price. The endof-year record also represents the number of analysts. The forecast error in the disclosure quality
index is measured as the absolute value of the difference between the actual EPS and the mean
estimates, divided by the previous year’s closing price. The total I/B/E/S samples then leave us
with 117,067 observations. After merging the Compustat database and I/B/E/S database, we have
a final sample of 45,245 observations in this study. The sample selection procedure is shown in
Panel A of Table 2.1.
Panel B of Table 2.1 shows summary statistics of disclosure quality variables and
fundamental variables on the overall sample. The summary statistics by firm life cycle stage are
reported in Table 2.2. The proportion of firms in each life cycle corresponds with Dickinson (2011),
with the largest proportions of firms at the growth (30.79%) and mature (43.18%) stages, and the
lowest proportion in decline (6.78%) firms. Dickinson (2011) does not find a significant difference
in the Market-to-Book ratio between firm life cycles. However, our sample shows that growth
firms have the highest average Market-to-Book ratio (5.802), which possibly represents the higher
market expectation of firm growth. A higher Market-to-Book ratio is also found in decline firms,
which possibly indicates that these firms are over-valued. We also observe that mature firms have
the highest disclosure quality (0.578), while decline firms bear the lowest (0.523) quality.
INSERT TABLE 2.1
INSERT TABLE 2.2
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5.2 Empirical results
5.2.1 Main results
Table 2.3 presents the correlation matrix for the variables included in our regression model.
We observe that the Pearson correlation coefficients between DisQual and the control variables
are significant for Size, ROA, Leverage, For_Sales, R&D, and LogSeg. The significance of these
control variables validates their inclusion in the regression model. As such, we turn to our
multivariate analysis.
INSERT TABLE 2.3
INSERT TABLE 2.4
The results of our OLS regression model (Equation 1) are shown in Table 2.4. In the table,
we find that size, leverage, loss indicator, R&D are negatively associated with disclosure quality,
and foreign sales and total number of segments are positively associated with disclosure quality.
Total number of observations in the regression model is 37,453, because the model include a
leading ROA and more observations are dropped because of lack of data.
We obtain residuals from Model (1) as our measure of disclosure quality that is impacted
by the management and see if the disclosure quality residuals are different across firm life cycle
stages. The average disclosure quality residuals are shown in Table 2.5. From the table, we can
see that the average residuals are positive for growth and mature firms, while negative for
introduction, shake-out and decline firms. This provides evidence that growth firms and mature
firms have higher disclosure quality, followed by introduction firm, and shake-out firms and
decline firms have lower disclosure quality, as is impacted by the management efforts.
5.2.2 Additional analysis
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We also track if the trend of management’s impact on disclosure changes across firm life
cycle stages. We provide how residuals of disclosure quality changes at t+1, and t+2 years after
the first year firm life cycle is identified. The trend is shown in Table 2.5. The disclosure residuals
for introduction and decline firms decrease over time, while those for growth and mature firms
increase over time. Even though shake-out firm has negative disclosure quality residuals, the
absolute value of disclosure quality residuals decreases over time. This indicates that the disclosure
quality residuals for shake-out firms increase over time.
INSERT TABLE 2.5
6.0 CONCLUSION
Given that disclosures are a primary form of communication between firms and investors,
disclosures' quality is essential. In particular, higher disclosure quality leads to lower information
asymmetry, thus making capital markets more efficient (Brown and Hillegeist 2007). In this paper,
we examine the effect of firms’ life cycle stage on disclosure quality. Prior literature documents
that firms’ incentives and subsequent behavior differ depending on their current life cycle stage,
and, as such, it is possible that life cycle stages influence the quality of firms’ disclosures. Overall,
we find that disclosure quality differs across firm life cycles. Specifically, firms currently included
in the growth, and mature life cycle stages have higher disclosure quality than firms in other stages,
suggesting that life cycle stages impact disclosure quality.
Our study contributes to the literature examining financial disclosures by documenting firm
life cycles as a significant determinant of disclosure quality. Prior study finds that disclosure
quality is negatively associated with cost of capital. Research that studies firm life cycle and cost
of capital also finds that growth and mature firms have lower cost of capital than other firm groups.
Our results correspond to these relationships and find that disclosure quality is higher for growth
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and mature firms than other firm groups. Lastly, since analysts’ and investors’ behaviors are
associated with disclosure quality, identifying firm life cycle is associated with disclosure quality,
our results will help financial report users make better decisions.

24

References
Anderson, R.C., Duru, A. and Reeb, D.M. 2009. Founders, heirs, and corporate opacity in the
United States. Journal of Financial economics 92 (2): 205-222.
Anthony, J.H. and Ramesh, K. 1992. Association between accounting performance measures and
stock prices: A test of the life cycle hypothesis. Journal of Accounting and economics 15(23): 203-227.
Banyi, M.L. and Kahle, K.M. 2014. Declining propensity to pay? A re-examination of the lifecycle
theory. Journal of Corporate Finance 27: 345-366.
Barclay, M.J. and Smith, C.W. 2005. The capital structure puzzle: The evidence revisited. Journal
of Applied Corporate Finance 17 (1): 8-17.
Barron, O.E. and Qu, H. 2014. Information asymmetry and the ex ante impact of public disclosure
quality on price efficiency and the cost of capital: Evidence from a laboratory market. The
Accounting Review 89 (4): 1269-1297.
Barth, M.E., Kasznik, R. and McNichols, M.F. 2001. Analyst coverage and intangible
assets. Journal of accounting research 39 (1): 1-34.
Biddle, G.C. and Hilary, G. 2006. Accounting quality and firm-level capital investment. The
Accounting Review 81 (5): 963-982.
Botosan, C.A. 1997. Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital. Accounting review: 323-349.
Botosan, C.A. and Plumlee, M.A. 2002. A re‐examination of disclosure level and the expected
cost of equity capital. Journal of accounting research 40 (1): 21-40.
Brown, S. and Hillegeist, S.A. 2007. How disclosure quality affects the level of information
asymmetry. Review of Accounting Studies 12 (2-3): 443-477.
Bushman, R.M. and Smith, A.J. 2001. Financial accounting information and corporate
governance. Journal of accounting and Economics 32(1-3): 237-333.
Choi, J., Choi, W. and Lee, E., 2016. Corporate life cycle and earnings benchmarks. Australian
Accounting Review 26(4): 415-428.

25

DeAngelo, H., DeAngelo, L. and Stulz, R.M. 2006. Dividend policy and the earned/contributed
capital mix: a test of the life-cycle theory. Journal of Financial economics 81 (2): 227-254.
Diamond, D.W. 1991. Monitoring and reputation: The choice between bank loans and directly
placed debt. Journal of political Economy 99 (4): 689-721.
Dickinson, V. 2011. Cash flow patterns as a proxy for firm life cycle. The Accounting Review 86
(6): 1969-1994.
Drake, M.S., Myers, J.N. and Myers, L.A. 2009. Disclosure quality and the mispricing of accruals
and cash flow. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance 24(3): 357-384.
Easley, D. and O'hara, M. 2004. Information and the cost of capital. The journal of finance 59 (4):
1553-1583.
Faff, R., Kwok, W.C., Podolski, E.J. and Wong, G. 2016. Do corporate policies follow a lifecycle? Journal of Banking & Finance 69: 95-107.
Filatotchev, I., Toms, S. and Wright, M. 2006. The firm's strategic dynamics and corporate
governance life-cycle. International Journal of Managerial Finance 2 (4): 256-279.
Francis, J., Nanda, D. and Olsson, P. 2008. Voluntary disclosure, earnings quality, and cost of
capital. Journal of accounting research 46 (1): 53-99.
Francis, J., Philbrick, D. and Schipper, K., 1994. Shareholder litigation and corporate
disclosures. Journal of accounting research 32(2): 137-164.
Gao, P. 2010. Disclosure quality, cost of capital, and investor welfare. The Accounting Review 85
(1): 1-29.
Gietzmann, M. and Ireland, J. 2005. Cost of capital, strategic disclosures and accounting
choice. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 32 (3‐4): 599-634.
Gort, M. and Klepper, S. 1982. Time paths in the diffusion of product innovations. The economic
journal 92 (367): 630-653.
Grullon, G. and Michaely, R., 2002. Dividends, share repurchases, and the substitution
hypothesis. the Journal of Finance, 57(4), pp.1649-1684.
26

Habib, A. and Hasan, M.M. 2017. Firm life cycle, corporate risk‐taking and investor
sentiment. Accounting & Finance 57 (2): 465-497.
Hasan, M.M., Hossain, M. and Habib, A. 2015. Corporate life cycle and cost of equity
capital. Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics 11 (1): 46-60.
Hasan, M.M., Al-Hadi, A., Taylor, G. and Richardson, G. 2017. Does a firm’s life cycle explain
its propensity to engage in corporate tax avoidance? European Accounting Review 26 (3):
469-501.
Healy, P.M., Hutton, A.P. and Palepu, K.G. 1999. Stock performance and intermediation changes
surrounding sustained increases in disclosure. Contemporary accounting research 16 (3):
485-520.
Healy, P.M. and Palepu, K.G. 2001. Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital
markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature. Journal of accounting and
economics 31 (1-3): 405-440.
Hribar, P. and Yehuda, N. 2015. The mispricing of cash flows and accruals at different life‐cycle
stages. Contemporary Accounting Research 32 (3): 1053-1072.
Hui, K.W. and Matsunaga, S.R. 2015. Are CEOs and CFOs rewarded for disclosure quality? The
Accounting Review 90 (3): 1013-1047.
Jenkins, D.S., Kane, G.D. and Velury, U. 2004. The impact of the corporate life-cycle on the valuerelevance of disaggregated earnings components. Review of Accounting and Finance 3 (4):
5-20.
Jovanovic, B. 1982b. Truthful disclosure of information. The Bell Journal of Economics: 36-44.
Khurana, I.K., Pereira, R. and Martin, X. 2006. Firm growth and disclosure: An empirical
analysis. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 41 (2): 357-380.
Lambert, R., Leuz, C. and Verrecchia, R.E. 2007. Accounting information, disclosure, and the cost
of capital. Journal of accounting research 45 (2): 385-420.
Lanen, W.N. and Verrecchia, R.E. 1987. Operating decisions and the disclosure of management
accounting information. Journal of Accounting Research 165-189.

27

Lang, M.H. and Lundholm, R.J. 1996. Corporate disclosure policy and analyst behavior. The
Accounting review: 467-492.
Lee, Y.J., Petroni, K.R. and Shen, M. 2006. Cherry picking, disclosure quality, and comprehensive
income reporting choices: The case of property‐liability insurers. Contemporary
Accounting Research 23(3): 655-692.
Leuz, C. and Verrecchia, R.E. 2000. The economic consequences of increased disclosure. Journal
of accounting research: 91-124.
Myers, S.C. 1977. Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of financial economics 5 (2):
147-175.
O'Connor, T. and Byrne, J. 2015. Governance and the corporate life-cycle. International Journal
of Managerial Finance 11 (1): 23-43.
Spence, A.M. 1977. Entry, capacity, investment and oligopolistic pricing. The Bell Journal of
Economics: 534-544.
Spence, A.M. 1979. Investment strategy and growth in a new market. J. Reprints Antitrust L. &
Econ. 10: 345.
Spence, A.M. 1981. The learning curve and competition. The Bell Journal of Economics: 49-70.
Suberi, A. Z. M., Hsu, G., & Wyatt, A. 2012. The relation between firm growth and accounting
quality: A test of the life cycle hypothesis, Working Paper, University of Queensland,
Australia.
Verrecchia, R.E. 1983. Discretionary disclosure. Journal of accounting and economics 5: 179-194.
Verrecchia, R.E., 2001. Essays on disclosure. Journal of accounting and economics, 32(1-3),
pp.97-180.
Welker, M. 1995. Disclosure policy, information asymmetry, and liquidity in equity
markets. Contemporary accounting research 11 (2): 801-827.
Wernerfelt, B. 1985. The dynamics of prices and market shares over the product life cycle. Management
Science 31 (8): 928-939.
28

Figure 2.1 Firm life cycle stages according to the signs of cash flows

1
Introduction
–

2
Growth
+

3
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+

4
Shake-Out
–

5
Shake-Out
+

6
Decline
–

Cash flow from
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–

–

–

–

+

+

Cash flow from
financing activities

+

+

–

–

+/-

+/-

Cash flow from
operating activities

Source: Dickinson (2011)
Dickinson (2011) assigns firm life cycle stages according to the signs of cash flows. For example, if a firm has negative cash flows from
operating activities and investing activities, but positive cash flows from financing activities, then the firm is at introduction stage. This
firm life cycle stage is non-linear, which means that the life cycle stages do not follow a sequential pattern. For example, Coca-Cola
company was at mature stage from the year 1990 to the year 2007, but it was at growth stage in 2008, and CVS company went from
decline stage to growth stage from 1997 to 1998.
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Table 2.1 Sample Selection and Description

Panel A: Sample Selection Procedure (1993-2018)
Number of Firm-years
Fundamental data from Compustat
I/B/E/S data available
Total number of observations

Number of firms

129,457
117,067
45,245

16,573
16,213
6,403

Panel B: Distribution Statistics (n=45,245)
Mean

Std. Dev.

Q1

Median

Q3

DQ Index

0.560

0.178

0.433

0.567

0.700

Log_Assets

6.942

1.917

5.583

6.836

8.166

MB Ratio

4.091

219.916

1.292

2.151

3.696

ROA

-0.016

0.433

-0.020

0.035

0.082

ROA Volatility

5.671

179.295

0.025

0.057

0.144

Loss

0.305

0.460

0.000

0.000

1.000

Analysts

8.241

6.791

3.000

6.000

11.000

Leverage

0.223

0.243

0.012

0.171

0.348

R&D

0.064

0.165

0.000

0.000

0.069

Foreign Sales

0.012

0.059

0.000

0.000

0.013

Shareholders

36.293

2383.892

0.205

1.095

6.200

Segments

1.185

0.710

0.693

0.693

1.386
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Table 2.2 Descripted Statistics by Life Cycle Stage

Pooled

Introduction

Growth

Mature

Shake-out

Decline

n

45,245

4,373

13,933

19,335

4,338

3,066

% of n

100%

9.67%

30.79%

43.18%

9.59%

6.78%

DQ Index

0.556

0.534

0.560

0.578

0.525

0.523

Log Assets

6.942

5.420

7.124

7.426

7.6.940

5.198

MB Ratio

4.091

0.834

6.188

3.444

2.888

5.031

ROA

-0.016

-0.359

0.042

0.061

0.020

-0.327

ROA Volatility

5.671

17.976

4.881

2.728

4.978

11.441

Loss

0.305

0.812

0.218

0.153

0.362

0.867

Analysts

8.241

5.621

8.434

9.380

4.723

5.007

Leverage

0.222

0.213

0.245

0.220

0.204

0.179

For_Sales

0.012

-0.013

0.013

0.020

0.009

-0.009

R&D

0.064

0.223

0.043

0.024

0.054

0.202

Segments

1.185

1.034

1.192

1.228

1.212

1.048

a. Disclosure index (dependent variable)
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Table 2.3 Correlation coefficients between Disclosure quality (DiscQual) and the independent variables

DiscQual
DQ Index

ROA_

For_

Vol

Sales

-0.1160

-0.1299

-0.0397

0.3818

0.3153

Size

ROA

MTB

Leverage

R&D

LogSeg

-0.0244

0.2214

0.3108

0.1557

0.0922

0.0335

0.2305

-0.5229

0.2127

-0.3652

0.1591

-0.0897

-0.2821

0.3331

-0.1918

0.0395

-0.1060

0.0542

0.1401

0.2437

0.0337

-0.2156

-0.0244

-0.3200

0.0154

-0.1895

0.4155

-0.0751

0.0973

0.0524

Size

-0.0362

ROA

0.0603

0.2037

MTB

0.0032

0.0060

0.0089

Leverage

-0.1124

0.2102

-0.0385

0.0073

ROA_Vol

-0.0057

0.0070

-0.0067

0.0031

0.0035

For_Sales

0.0875

0.1326

0.1959

0.0004

-0.0439

-0.0024

R&D

0.0213

-0.3392

-0.4925

-0.0034

-0.1112

0.0035

-0.0899

Logseg

0.0243

0.2047

0.0421

0.0084

0.0039

-0.0050

0.0342

This table shows the distributions and correlations for the variables used in the analysis. The numbers below the diagonal
are the Pearson correlation coefficients, and numbers above the diagonal are Spearman correlations. Bold figures are statistically
significant from 0 at the 5% (two-tailed) level.
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0.0308
-0.0538

Table 2.4 Regression of Disclosure Quality for Residuals
VARIABLES

DQ

Log_Assets

-0.011***
(-7.731)

MB Ratio

0.000***
(3.589)

ROA

0.001
(0.294)

Leverage

-0.044***
(-5.928)

ROA Volatility

-0.000
(-1.147)

Loss

-0.025***
(-7.283)

Analysts

0.006***
(19.968)

R&D

-0.021*
(-1.914)

Foreign Sales

0.083***
(3.578)

Shareholders

-0.000***
(-2.960)

Segments

0.007***

Leading ROA

0.031***

(2.913)

(3.656)
Constant

0.669***
(14.106)
37,4532

Observations

2

Adjusted R-squared

0.248

Industry FE

YES

Year FE

YES

The model includes a leading ROA, which is ROA of the year t+1. Therefore, about 1,000 observations are lost.
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Table 2.5 Disclosure Residuals on Life Cycle

Pooled

Introduction

Growth

Mature

Shake-out

Decline

Year relative to formation
t

0.0059

-0.0022

0.0014

0.0059

-0.0221

-0.0150

t+1

0.0058

-0.0076

0.0022

0.0118

-0.0148

-0.0176

t+2

0.0038

-0.0185

0.0030

0.0115

-0.0122

-0.0207

N

45,245

4,373

13,933

19,335

4,338

3,066

% of total n

100%

9.67%

30.79%

43.18%

9.59%

6.78%
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Abstract
This study investigates whether firm life cycle is associated with fraud. According
to the fraud triangle theory, incentives and opportunities are important factors that lead to
fraud (Dorminey, Fleming, Kranacher, and Riley 2012). Following Dickinson (2011), this
paper uses cash flow patterns as a proxy for life cycle stages. Firms in different life cycle
stages have different combinations of signs of cash flows, so the incentives and
opportunities are likely to be different. Therefore, we expect that the likelihood of
committing fraud is different across life cycle stages. We identify 182 fraud firms with
available data from the AAER database and utilize a 4-to-1 matched sample, as well as the
overall sample in our analysis. We find that the introduction firms are more likely to
commit fraud, while mature firms are less likely to commit fraud.

36

1.0 Introduction
Financial Fraud has been costly for both the business world and society as a whole.
Prior research has been studying how to detect fraud from the characteristics of the firms,
including the relationship between financial fraud and corporate governance, the pressure
to meet analysts’ forecasts, and executive compensation (Hogan, Rezaee, Riley and Velury
2008; Bell and Carcello 2000; Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney 1996; and Farber 2005).
However, no prior research has studied how firm life cycle stages can impact the likelihood
of a firm committing fraud. Firms at different life cycle stages have different goals and
incentives, and as a result, the likelihood that a firm commits fraud may be different across
life cycle stages. If firm life cycle stages are associated with the likelihood of fraud,
financial statement users may be better able to detect fraud. Therefore, this paper aims to
identify which life cycle stage firms are more likely to commit fraud.
The study of firm life cycle stages’ impact on fraud has two advantages. First, this
study investigates the likelihood of fraud from a macro perspective. Prior studies explore
the potentially associated variables with fraud from a micro perspective, focusing on
individual characteristics of firms or individuals that could lead to fraud. However, cash
flow patterns as a proxy for firm life cycle stages imply combinations of different firm
characteristics. Both Anthony and Ramesh (1992) and Dickinson (2011) find evidence that
firm characteristics are different among life cycle stages, so that firm cycle stages can be
considered as "organic" combinations of variables. Therefore, the first advantage of this
paper is to study how combinations of naturally formed firm characteristics are associated
with fraud, instead of the study of any individual variable. Second, using cash flow patterns
as firm life cycle stage proxy is a costless and parsimonious approach. Cash flow
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information is available on the Statement of Cash Flows of public firms and should be
available to auditors if the firm is a private firm, so investors, creditors, and auditors can
have easy access to this information. Dickinson derived firm life cycle stages from
combinations of the signs of cash flows (see Figure 3.1), and anyone who has access to the
signs of cash flows can put the signs in the right bucket and identify firm life cycle stage
of the firm year immediately. Therefore, firm life cycle stage is a costless and parsimonious
approach. If life cycle stage is associated with the likelihood of fraud, the introduction of
this variable into the analysis will be effective and economically efficient.
The sample in this paper is composed of 182 fraud firms identified from the SEC
AAER database. Each fraud firm is matched with four non-fraud firms based on industry
and total assets in the first year of fraud. The results provide evidence that the likelihood
of firms committing fraud is different across life cycle stages. Specifically, introduction
firms are most likely to commit fraud, followed by growth and declining firms, while
mature firms and shake-out firms are the least likely to commit fraud. Further analysis will
include incentives and opportunities variables and how incentives and opportunities
interact with life cycle stages in impacting the likelihood of fraud. We carry out a
robustness check by including all firm years available and find similar results.
The findings of this paper add to the fraud literature by identifying additional
characteristics of firms that are likely to commit fraud. As is mentioned above, this is a
costless and parsimonious approach and will help auditors and investors detect or predict
fraud more efficiently. It also adds to firm life cycle literature by providing evidence that
firm life cycle stages derived from cash flow patterns are associated with additional firm
characteristics, i.e., the likelihood of committing fraud. Lastly, this paper provides

38

investors, creditors, and auditors with additional information to detect and predict fraud
more effectively and efficiently.
2.0 Background
Firm life cycle theory suggests that firms transition between different life cycle
stages, and the current life cycle stage is determined by various internal and external factors,
such as strategy choices, managerial ability, and competitive environment (Dickinson
2011). Prior research has found that firm behaviors are different across life cycle stages.
For example, Faff et al. (2016) find that firms make fewer investments and issue less equity
as they become more mature, while debt issuance and cash holding decrease as firms enter
mature and declining stages. Choi, Choi, and Lee (2016) also find that corporate life cycle
plays a significant role in a firm’s meeting or beating earnings benchmark behavior.
Moreover, as indicated by fluctuation of return on investment and return on equity,
corporate risk-taking is higher during the introduction and decline stages, but lower during
the mature stage (Habib and Hasan 2017). Other research finds that firm life cycle
influences the firms' strategic behaviors. For example, Elsayed and Paton (2009) find that
the relationship between financial performance and corporate social responsibility (CSR)
engagement varies across life cycle stages. Liu (2006) finds that the differences in
operating decisions among life cycles affect accrual qualities.
Research also finds that other firm characteristics are different across firm life cycle
stages. Drake and Martin (2015) find that executive compensation is more sensitive to
accounting measures in the mature stage. Investors behavior is also found to be different
across life cycle stages, as is found by Dickinson, kassa, and Schaber (2018) that investors
tend to rely more on analysts’ forecasts for growth and mature stages, while accounting
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information is more value-relevant for introduction and decline stages firms. Cost of capital
also follows a U-shaped trend with introduction and declining stages have higher cost of
capital, while growth and mature stages have lower cost of capital (Hasan et al. 2015).
Haribar and Yehuda (2015) find that total accruals and free cash flows are mispriced to
various degrees at different life cycle stages. However, no prior research has studied
whether firm life cycle stages are associated with the likelihood of fraud.
Dickinson (2011) identifies life cycle stages using a combination directional cash
flows from operating, financing, and investing activities (see Figure 3.1), which reflect
firm activities. For example, introduction firms have negative cash flows from operating
activities, positive cash flows from financing activities, and negative cash flows from
investing activities. This implies that introduction firms invest in long-term assets, such as
property, plant, and equipment, using external financing. Similar implications apply to
other firm life cycle stages as well. Dickinson (2011) also provides evidence that firm
characteristics, such as size, profitability, and operating efficiency, are different across life
cycle stages. An advantage of the cash flow proxy to define life cycle stages is that it
defines life cycle stages based on an “organic” combination of firm activities and
characteristics, and the life cycle stages do not transition monotonically. Given that firms
are continually developing new products, Dickinson (2011) argues that a firm should be
considered a portfolio with different products at different life cycle stages. Therefore, firm
life cycle stages are not monotone like firm age. An old firm can be in the introduction
stage if it focuses on a new product. The firm might need to invest in new equipment and
might also need to finance the investment. In addition, because the firm is trying to
introduce the new product, it might have lenient receivable collecting policies and have
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negative cash flows from operating activities. In this way, the signs of cash flows fit in the
bucket of introduction firm and the old firm come to be at introduction stage. Similar
analysis applies to other age and life cycle stage combinations as well.
INSERT FIGURE 3.1
Prior research has explored the possible associations between firms' or employees'
specific activities and fraud to help auditors increase the likelihood of detecting fraud. For
example, Clor-Proell, Kaplan, and Proell (2015) find that budget goal difficulty and
promotion availability interact in affecting the employees’ behavior. Other research also
finds the association between affiliations and fraud (Perri and Brody 2012). In a field study,
Carpenter (2007) finds evidence that brainstorming helps audit teams generate new quality
fraud ideas and improve fraud risk assessments. Wilks and Zimbelman (2004) also propose
using game theory and strategic reasoning concepts to prevent and detect fraud. Some other
research finds the association between firm characteristics and fraud. For example, research
finds that executive compensation, the board of directors’ composition, and corporate
governance are found to be associated with fraud, and that abnormal turnover of outside
directors is related to financial fraud (Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew 2006; Burns and
Kedia 2006; Beasley 1996; Collins, Gong, and Li 2009; and Gao, Kim, Tsang, and Wu
2017). However, no prior research has studied whether firm life cycle stage is related to
the likelihood of fraud.
According to the fraud triangle, three criteria must be present for fraud to occur:
perceived pressure, perceived opportunity, and rationalization (Dorminey, Fleming,
Kranacher and Riley 2012; Trompeter, Carpenter, Desai, Jones, and Riley 2013). As is
discussed above, strategy choices and competitive environment are different across firm
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life cycle stages. Therefore, it is likely that the firm incentives are various across life cycle
stages. For example, introduction and growth firms rely on financing to fund operation and
investment, so these firms have more substantial incentives to improve their financial
reports to lower cost of capital, while mature firms do not have these incentives. If
financing and operating are the main focus of the management, corporate governance will
likely be weaker. Therefore, this paper focuses on different incentives and opportunities
and how these incentives and opportunities interact with life cycle stages to impact the
likelihood of fraud. Rationalization is not included in this analysis because we are unaware
of an archival method that can assess rationalization.
Empirically, research has provided evidence that CEOs have incentives to meet
earnings expectations (Payne and Robb 2000; Matsunaga and Park 2001; and Boschen,
Duru, Gordon and Smith 2003). Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) suggest that CFOs
also tend to beat earnings benchmarks and seek to commit earnings smoothing. Hogan et
al. (2008) also discussed the characteristics of firms committing financial statement fraud
as identified in the literature, and they find that firms that are pressured to meet analysts'
forecasts, rapid growth (Bell and Carcello 2000), the need for financing, and poor
performance (Dechow et al. 1996) are more likely to commit financial reporting fraud.
Introduction firms and growth firms have positive cash flows from financing activities,
which indicates that these firms acquire funds to expand and grow. Therefore, introduction
and growth firms have more substantial incentives to lower cost of capital than mature
firms, which do not acquire financing to fund other activities. Operating cash flows are
positive in growth firms but negative in introduction firms. This difference implies that
even though they have the same incentives to acquire more financing, introduction firms
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are under more severe financial pressure than growth firms do. Other differences in
incentives are also likely to be generated from the different combinations of cash flows.
Therefore, the likelihood of fraud is different across life cycle stages. Besides, the above
analysis also suggests that introduction and growth firms have more substantial incentives
to commit fraud, while the incentives for introduction firms are more substantial because
they face more severe financial pressure.
Opportunity is the perception that the control is weak and that the chance of being
caught of committing the fraud is slight. Opportunities are significant for fraud behavior to
exist. A perpetrator (a firm or individual) cannot carry out the fraudulent behavior if there
are no opportunities, even though incentives exist. Corporate governance is strongly
associated with the likelihood of financial fraud (Dechow et al. 1996; Beasley 1996;
Beasley Carcello, Hermanson and Lapides 2000; and Farber 2005). Collins, Gong, and Li
(2009) find that corporate governance is associated with the backdating of executive stock
options, and Bell and Carcello (2009) find that weak internal control is related to the
incidence of fraud. Prior research has also found that the board of director composition,
related party transactions are associated with financial statement fraud (Beasley 1996;
Gordon, Henry, Louwers and Reed 2007). If managers of firms at certain life cycle stages
have to put most of their effort into operation and financing, corporate governance is likely
to be weakened. Therefore, we expect the opportunities of fraud to be different across firm
life cycle stages, which may impact the firms’ likelihood of committing fraud.
Prior research addressed that firm or industry growth stages impact the likelihood
to commit fraud. The National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (American
Institute for Certified Public Accountants, 1987: 29) suggests that newly public companies
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are more likely to commit financial statement fraud. Research has also found that when the
industry is growing fast, the likelihood of managerial fraud increases, and that in declining
industries, the incidence of management fraud is likely to be higher (Hansen et al. 1996).
However, no research has captured whether and how the specific firm life cycle stage is
associated with the likelihood of fraud, and there were no explicitly defined firm life cycle
proxies in that research. Using cash flows as a proxy for firm life cycle, following
Dickinson (2011), this paper studies the likelihood of fraud across firm life cycle stages.
3.0 Hypotheses development
Different firm life cycle stages have different cash flow patterns, and the
combinations of the signs of cash flows reflect the firm's current financial situation. The
combinations of cash flow activities highlight some potential incentives for committing
fraud. According to expectation theory and prospect theory, people make decisions by
considering both the potential gain and the losses of the options. This applies to
management fraudulent behavior. Management can smooth earnings or have personal
financial gains if they commit misreporting or asset misappropriation. However, they are
at risk of being caught, face legal action, reputational costs, and difficulty obtaining
financing in the future. For example, earnings manipulation can lower cost and capital, but
cost of capital will be higher if the fraudulent behavior is detected (Dechow, Sloan, and
Sweeney 1996). Intuitively, the losses will be more significant for firms generating cash
inflows from day-to-day business than for those that are not. Therefore, we use the firm
life cycle approach to evaluate how a firm situation from a general picture impacts the
likelihood of fraud.
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Even though our analysis is based on firm life cycles, it is essential to understand
the impact of each section of cash flows on the incentives and opportunities for committing
fraud. Negative cash flow from operating activities is an indicator that the company is
struggling to generate cash inflows from the business's day-to-day operations, even when
reporting a profit on the income statement. Because negative cash flows from operating
activities can be somewhat concerning to investors, managers have an increased incentive
to commit fraud to make things appear better. The PCAOB AS §2401.85 illustrates the
examples of fraud incentives and opportunities, and financial pressure is among the most
important incentives for firms to commit fraud. As a result, the firm life cycle stages with
negative cash flow from operating activities (i.e., the introduction and decline stages) might
be more likely to commit fraud due to increased financial pressure.
Financing activities might also cause incentives for fraud. Pecking order theory
suggests that firms access bank debts first then issue stocks (Myers 1984; Diamond 1991).
Firms that need financing have to keep decent financial performance to obtain funding
from creditors or investors. When firms' performance deteriorates, there are more
substantial incentives to make financial performance look better through fraudulent means.
While other firms might also have incentives to cover bad performance, incentives for
firms that need financing are likely to be stronger. This is because these firms need cash
inflows to fund and expand their regular business and that financial performance is
essential for creditors and investors. In fact, Kellogg and Kellogg (1991) find that one of
the main reasons for fraud, misrepresentation, and manipulation in a financial statement is
to encourage investors to buy an interest in a company's stock as owners or in bonds as
creditors.

45

Besides the incentives to make financial reports look better, firms that need
financing also have the incentives to lower the cost of capital. Prior research finds that
lowering the cost of capital is one of the incentives for firms to commit earnings
manipulation and that while unidentified earnings manipulation is associated with a lower
cost of capital, the cost of capital will be higher if the fraudulent behavior is detected
(Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney 1996). This raises the question regarding how managers
perceive the payoffs of committing fraud based on the expected likelihood of being caught.
Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 2013) states that people tend to be risk-seeking
when facing losses and risk-averse when facing gains. Therefore, if we consider the fraud
being detected as a loss, managers will tend to be risk-seeking when deciding because they
perceive that the probability of being detected is low. Therefore, managers of introduction,
growth, and some declining firms have more incentives to commit fraud because firms at
these life cycle stages have positive cash flows from financing activities.
Unlike operating and financing activities, which require firms’ access to external
resources, investing activities involve more internal decisions. Introduction firms and
growth firms make large investments to deter entry and obsolescence increases instead of
new investments for mature firms. Therefore, cash flows from investing activities are
negative for firms at the three life cycle stages. On the other hand, declining firms need to
liquidate assets to service debt (Dickinson 2011), so investing cash flow is positive for
declining firms. Because investing activities involve internal decisions, there are no
incentives associated with investing activities to improve financial reports or lower cost of
capital. However, liquidation of assets by declining firms implies financial pressure.
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Therefore, cash flow from investing activities indicates that declining firms are more likely
than introduction, growth, and mature firms to commit fraud.
To sum up, incentives to commit fraud are stronger for introduction firms and
growth firms because they need significant financing for their growth, and introduction
firms are more likely to commit fraud because of their struggle in collecting cash for their
operating activities. Mature firms, on the other hand, do not have these incentives.
Declining firms also face financial pressure because they likely have to liquidate their
assets to pay off debts, as indicated by positive cash flow from investing activities.
Based on the discussion above, our hypothesis is:
H1: Firms’ likelihood of committing fraud is different across firms’ life cycle stages.
4.0 Research method
To determine whether firms at certain life cycle stages are more likely to commit
fraud, we carry out three different tests. Firstly, before any multivariate tests, we would
like to see whether the proportions of fraud firm years among all firm years within the
specific life cycle stages are different across life cycle stages. A Pearson Chi-square test is
carried out to test the proportions statistically.
Second, we use a logistic regression model to evaluate firms' likelihood of
committing fraud at different life cycle stages. A similar logistic regression model is used
in Beasley (1996), Erickson et al. (2006), and Burns and Kedia (2006), which include a
dependent variable equal to 1 if fraud occurred in the firm-year, and 0 otherwise. The main
variables of interest are indicators for the different firm life cycle stages. As mentioned
above, firms are continually moving between the different life cycles to do what is best for
the company at that specific time, and firm life cycle stages do not transition monotonically.
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Therefore, we assign a life cycle stage to each firm year according to the signs of cash
flows during the fiscal year. The model also includes the natural log of total assets as a
control variable. Industry fixed effect is included in the model, and standard errors are
clustered at firm level. Therefore, the model is as follows:
Fraudit=0+1Introductionit+2Growthit+3Matureit+4Shake-outit
+5 LnAsset ++6 Industry Dummy + it

(1)

Where:
Fraud
Introduction

=
=

Growth

=

Mature

=

Shake-out

=

LnAsset

=

1 if fraud occurred during the year, 0 otherwise;
1 if cash flows designate the firm as in the introduction
stage for the year, 0 otherwise;
1 if cash flows designate the firm as in the growth stage
for the year, 0 otherwise;
1 if cash flows designate the firm as in the mature stage
for the year, 0 otherwise;
1 if cash flows designate the firm as in the shake-out
stage for the year, 0 otherwise;
Natural log of total assets.

Firm life cycle stages are defined according to Dickinson (2011), which
differentiates firm life cycle stages based on the combinations of the signs of cash flows.
There are eight possible combinations of the signs of cash flows, which are assigned to five
life cycle stages: introduction, growth, mature, shake-out, and decline. A detailed
assignment is shown in Figure 3.1. The model above is defined as Model (1) in this study.
Lastly, since incentives and opportunities are the main factors for fraudulent
behaviors, we bring in the incentives and opportunities variables from Boyld and LewisWestern (2018) and see if they are different across life cycle stages. We also include a
chronological analysis of these variables, following Dickinson (2011).
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5.0 Samples and empirical results
5.1 Samples
Firm fundamental data are obtained from Compustat and fraud data from the AAER
database from 1980 to 2018. In this study, 182 fraud firms are identified with non-missing
data. The database includes fraud start and end times for each fraud firm, so we merge the
AAER database to Compustat by year and obtained 100,151 firm years. Firms that are in
financial and regulated industries are deleted from the sample.
Our percentage test and regression analysis include two main samples, the overall
sample, and the matched sample. Each fraud firm is matched with four non-fraud firms
with similar sizes in the same industry in the matched sample. For example, if the AAER
discloses that firm A commits fraud from 2000 to 2003, four non-fraud firms are found in
the same industry with similar total assets in the year 2000. Then firm years from 2000 to
2003 are included for the matched non-fraud firms. The matched sample is used to better
access whether the likelihood of committing fraud is due to the life cycle stages or
underlying firm characteristics, following Erickson et al. (2005). The overall sample has
100,151 observations, and the matched sample has 1,983 observations. While it is likely
that the incentives and opportunities to commit fraud exist during the entire fraud period,
it is also possible that the incentives and opportunities only existed in the first year, but the
fraud continued to hide detection. Therefore, two additional samples that only use the first
year of fraud are included in the analysis. The first includes all observations with available
data, while the second a matched sample based on industry and total assets. The incentives
and opportunity factors chronological analysis include the overall sample only because it
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is an analysis based on the difference between life cycles the chronology of firms’
incentives and opportunities over time and do not involve comparison with non-fraud firms.
5.2 Empirical results
Table 3.1 shows the percentages of fraud firm years in the full sample and the
matched sample. As is shown in Panel B of Table 3.1, the percentage of fraud firm years
is 25.48% on average. The percentage of fraud firm years is 34.72% for the introduction
stage, 28.18% for the growth stage, 25.87% for the decline stage, 20.35% for the shakeout stage, and 19.72% for the mature stage. Among all life cycle stages, introduction stage
has the highest percentage of fraud firm years, followed by growth and decline stages.
Mature stage and shake-out stage have the lowest percentage of fraud firm years. Similar
ranks are shown for the one-year sample and one-year matched sample in Table 3.2. A
Pearson Chi-square test (p-value 0.000) on the percentages shows that the percentages of
fraud firm years in different life cycle stages are significantly different from each other.
These results support our hypothesis that firms with negative cash flows from operating
activities and positive cash flows from financing activities are more likely to commit fraud.
Firms at the growth stage need financing, so the growth stage follows the introduction to
the life stage that includes the most percentage of fraud firms. Mature firms have positive
cash flows from operating activities and negative cash flows from financing activities, and
mature firms have lower incentives to commit fraud. Since sample proportion is the
estimator of the population proportion, the results above suggest that the likelihood of fraud
is different across firm life cycle stages. Thus, H1 is supported.
INSERT TABLE 3.1
INSERT TABLE 3.2
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Table 3.3 reports the correlation coefficients between fraud and the different life
cycle stages. The correlation coefficient between fraud and introduction and growth stages
are positive, while that between fraud and the mature stage is negative. The coefficients
between fraud and decline and shake-out stages are not significant.
INSERT TABLE 3.3
Since Table 3.3 shows that the decline stage is not correlated with fraud, we use the
decline stage as the baseline and run a logistic regression using the model (1). Again, the
model is run on four different samples. They are labeled the full sample, the matched
sample, the one-year sample, and the one-year matched sample, respectively. Table 3.4
shows the results from the model for the two fraud-firm-year samples. For the full sample,
the coefficient for introduction stage is significantly positive. The coefficient for mature
stage is significantly negative. These are consistent with Table 3.1 and Table 3.2, which
indicate that introduction stage is riskier, while mature stage is less risky compared to other
firm life cycle stages. For the matched sample, only the coefficient for mature firms is
significant and negative. The results from Table 3.4 show that for the full sample of firms,
introduction firms are relatively more likely to commit fraud, while mature firms are less
likely to do so. These results imply that in general, if a firm has negative cash flows from
operating and investing activities and positive cash flows from financing activities only,
then the firm is a red flag in terms of the likelihood of committing fraud. If auditors
compare an auditee firm to its peers (same industry and similar total assets), mature firms
are relatively less likely to commit fraud. It implies that if a firm has positive cash flows
from operating activity but negative cash flows from investing and financing activities,
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then the firm is less likely to commit fraud. This implication holds for both the overall
sample and the matched sample.
INSERT TABLE 3.4
Table 3.5 contains the regression results on the one-year sample and one-year
matched only. For the one-year sample, the coefficient for introduction stage is positive
and significant, while the coefficient for shake-out stage is negative and significant.
Consistent with the full sample results, the introduction stage is relatively more likely to
be associated with the start of fraud compared to other life cycle stages. However, the
shake-out stage seems to be relatively less likely to be associated with the start of fraud.
For the one-year matched sample, the coefficient for mature stage is negative and
significant, and the coefficient for shake-out firm is negative and marginally significant.
The results imply that if a firm is at the mature stage, it is less likely to start to commit
fraud than its industry and size peers, while introduction and growth stage does not impact
the likelihood of beginning to commit fraud. The results on the one-year samples are
consistent with the full samples by showing that introduction firms are relatively more
likely to commit fraud, but mature firms are less likely to commit fraud, compared to
declining firms-the baseline. However, a significant difference lies in shake-out stage
between the full samples and the one-year samples. Shake-out firms are less likely to start
fraud than declining firms but are not significantly different from declining firms in terms
of impacting the likelihood of fraud during the fraud.
INSERT TABLE 3.5
Chronological analyses on incentive and opportunity factors are shown in Table 3.6
and 3.7, respectively. Like Boyld and Lewis-Western (2018), we include four incentive
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factors: Need Capital, Inconsistent Fundamental Signals, Low Cash and High Debt, and
Competitive Industry and Declining Margins. The sample size comes down to 77,304
because of missing data for incentives and opportunities factor variables. It appears that
introduction and decline firms have higher incentives to raise capital, and mature firms
have the lowest need for capital. Similar trends exist for cash and debt structures as well.
Results for inconsistent fundamental signals and competitive industry and declining
margins do not show significant differences. Results for opportunity-complexity show that
mature firms and growth firms have the highest complexity and introduction score, and
declining firms have the lowest complexity score. It is likely that introduction firms focus
more on profitability and growth and do not spend much efforts on increasing foreign sales
or mergers and acquisitions. However, introduction firms and decline firms have higher
scores for internal control weakness.
INSERT TABLE 3.6
6.0 Summary and conclusions
This study explores whether firm life cycle stages are associated with the likelihood
of fraud. The analysis provides evidence that introduction stage has the highest proportion
of fraud firm years, followed by growth firms. Decline and shake-out firms are in the
middle, and mature firms are less likely to commit fraud. Regression results are consistent
with the percentage analysis and the correlation coefficient table, but with mixed
significance. We find that some life cycle stages matter for the overall sample, such as
introduction stage, which is riskier for both the full samples and the one-year samples. Also,
mature stage seems to be less risky among firm peers for both the full samples and the oneyear samples. The shake-out stage is relatively less risky in terms of starting the fraud.
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There are several contributions to this paper. First of all, it adds to the literature by
finding additional variables associated with the likelihood of fraud. Second, this study finds
that fraud risk is different across different life cycle stages. Introduction firms are riskier
than other life cycle stages, and the mature stage is less risky in terms of committing fraud.
Lastly, the paper can help investors to detect and predict fraud more efficiently.
One limitation of this study is that the AAER database contains only the firms
identified as fraud firms by the SEC. As a result, the no-fraud sample potentially includes
the observations that had fraud but were not detected by the SEC. Second, the variables
that are associated with fraud are not studied exhaustedly, so potential omitted variable
bias could exist in the model. An implication but not limitation of this study is that even
though growth and decline firms are found not as risky as introduction firms, they should
not be considered as carrying "low" risk. No life cycle stages have been found to be "free"
from fraud, so all the firms should be audited thoroughly; only more attention should be
paid to introduction firms.
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Figure 3.1
Firm life cycle stages according to the signs of cash flows
1
Introduction

2
Growth

3
Mature

4
Shake-Out

5
Shake-Out

6
Decline

Cash flow from
operating activities

–

+

+

–

+

–

Cash flow from
investing activities

–

–

–

–

+

+

Cash flow from
financing activities

+

+

–

–

+/-

+/-

Source: Dickinson (2011)
Dickinson (2011) assigns firm life cycle stages according to the signs of cash flows. For example, if a firm has negative cash flows from
operating activities and investing activities, but positive cash flows from financing activities, then the firm is at introduction stage. This firm
life cycle stage is non-linear, which means that the life cycle stages do not follow a sequential pattern. For example, Coca-Cola company was
at mature stage from the year 1990 to the year 2007, but it was at growth stage in 2008, and CVS company went from decline stage to growth
stage from 1997 to 1998.
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Table 3.1 Total fraud percentages - Fraud firm years
Panel A: The 1-4 matched sample
Life Cycle

N

Fraud

Percentage

Mean %

Introduction

360

125

34.72%

25.48%

Growth

589

166

28.18%

25.48%

Mature

710

140

19.72%

25.48%

Decline

143

37

25.87%

25.48%

Shake-out

172

35

20.35%

25.48%

Chi-square = 100.252; p-value = 0.000
Panel B: The overall sample
Life Cycle

N

Fraud

Percentage

Mean %

Introduction

16,417

125

7.6%

5%

Growth

26,769

166

6.2%

5%

Mature

39,157

140

3.6%

5%

Decline

8,268

37

4.5%

5%

Shake-out

9,540

35

3.7%

5%

Chi-square = 52.055; p-value = 0.000
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Table 3.2 Total fraud percentages – First year of fraud
Panel A: The 1-4 matched sample
Life Cycle

N

Fraud

Percentage

Mean %

Introduction

141

49

34.75%

24.76%

Growth

243

68

27.98%

24.76%

Mature

234

41

17.52%

24.76%

Decline

55

15

27.27%

24.76%

Shake-out

62

9

14.52%

24.76%

Chi-square = 58.592; p-value =0.000
Panel B: The overall sample
Life Cycle

N

Fraud

Percentage

Mean %

Introduction

1,451

49

3.38%

2.26%

Growth

2,614

68

2.6%%

2.26%

Mature

2.183

41

1.88%

2.26%

Decline

808

15

1.86%

2.26%

Shake-out

999

9

0.9%

2.26%

Chi-square = 14.257; p-value = 0.07
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Table 3.3

Correlation coefficient table – Overall sample on fraud firm years (n=102,686)

Fraud

Introduction

Fraud

Introduction

Growth

Mature

Decline

Shake-out

1.000

0.017

0.011

-0.015

-0.002

-0.006

<.0001

0.000

<.0001

0.557

0.069

1.000

-0.259

-0.342

-0.129

-0.140

<.0001

<.0001

<.0001

<.0001

1.000

-0.466

-0.176

-0.190

<.0001

<.0001

<.0001

1.000

-0.232

-0.251

<.0001

<.0001

1.000

-0.095

0.017
<.0001

Growth

Mature

Decline

Shake-out

0.011

-0.259

0.000

<.0001

-0.015

-0.342

-0.466

<.0001

<.0001

<.0001

-0.002

-0.129

-0.176

-0.232

0.557

<.0001

<.0001

<.0001

-0.006

-0.140

-0.190

-0.251

-0.095

0.069

<.0001

<.0001

<.0001

<.0001

<.0001
1.000

The numbers above the diagonal are the Pearson correlations, and the numbers below the diagonal are Spearman correlations.
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Table 3.4 Regression results – Fraud firm years
Overall
fraud

Matched
fraud

LnAsset

0.172***
(0.0362)

0.189***
(0.0437)

Introduction

0.726***
(0.196)

0.365
(0.248)

Growth

0.119
(0.226)

-0.238
(0.261)

Mature

-0.473*
(0.242)

-0.706***
(0.273)

Shake-out

-0.275
(0.263)

-0.475
(0.299)

Intercept

-6.253***
(0.235)

-1.825***
(0.296)

N

100,151

1,983

Standard errors in parentheses
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*

p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table 3.5 Regression results – First year of fraud
Overall
fraud

Matched
fraud

LnAsset

0.156***
(0.0303)

0.154***
(0.0400)

Introduction

0.679**
(0.292)

0.223
(0.351)

Growth

0.0612
(0.282)

-0.339
(0.347)

Mature

-0.219
(0.297)

-0.920**
(0.360)

Shake-out

-0.990**
(0.429)

-0.920*
(0.474)

Intercept

-4.660***
(0.301)

-1.563***
(0.338)

8,100

741

N

Standard errors in parentheses
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* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table 3.6 Incentives Factors by Life Cycle Stage

Pooled

Introduction

Growth

Mature

Shake-out

Decline

t

0.18

0.8

0.03

0.02

0.12

0.86

t+1

0.16

0.77

0.02

0.01

0.11

0.87

t+2

0.16

0.71

0.03

0.02

0.11

0.8

Need Capital

Inconsistent Fundamental Signals
t

0.17

0.18

0.15

0.18

0.16

0.19

t+1

0.17

0.18

0.15

0.18

0.16

0.19

t+2

0.17

0.19

0.15

0.18

0.15

0.19

Low Cash, High Debt
t

0.14

0.21

0.13

0.11

0.15

0.17

t+1

0.14

0.23

0.14

0.1

0.15

0.18

t+2

0.14

0.22

0.13

0.11

0.15

0.18

Competitive Industry, Declining Margins
t

0.06

0.06

0.06

0.07

0.05

0.05

t+1

0.06

0.05

0.05

0.07

0.04

0.04

t+2

0.05

0.05

0.05

0.06

0.04

0.05

N

77,304

9,284

24,354

31,325

7,709

4,632

% of
total n

100.00%

12.01%

31.50%

40.52%

9.97%

5.99%
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Table 3.7 Opportunities Factors by Life Cycle Stage

Pooled

Introduction

Growth

Mature

Shake-out

Decline

t

0.16

0.09

0.18

0.18

0.12

0.07

t+1

0.17

0.09

0.18

0.2

0.13

0.07

t+2

0.17

0.09

0.18

0.21

0.15

0.08

Complexity

Internal Control Weakness
t

0.03

0.06

0.02

0.02

0.03

0.04

t+1

0.03

0.06

0.03

0.02

0.03

0.05

t+2

0.03

0.07

0.03

0.02

0.04

0.05

N

77,304

9,284

24,354

31,325

7,709

4,632

% of
total n

100.00%

12.01%

31.50%

40.52%

9.97%

5.99%
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ABSTRACT

Prior studies on agency theory suggest that agency problems exist in both for-profit
organizations and nonprofit organizations. CEO compensation is associated with agency problems
in nonprofit organizations (Core, Guay, and Verdi 2006). Aggarwal, Evans, and Nanda (2012)
found evidence that board size is negatively associated with pay-to-performance sensitivity for
nonprofit organizations. However, since donors are fund providers of nonprofit organizations, it is
also likely that donors have strong incentives to carry out the monitoring role externally. The
monitoring role of donors is limited to the donors’ ability to acquire nonprofit organization
information, but charity rating agencies make the information more accessible and understandable.
Given that prior research find that donors dislike high CEO compensation (Balsam and Harris
2014), this study focuses on whether charity rating availability is associated with negative pay-toperformance sensitivity. Using a sample derived from e-filed IRS Form 990s and Charity
Navigator rating records, this study provides evidence that rating availability is negatively related
to pay-to-performance sensitivity for nonprofit organizations. Additional tests provide evidence
that the overall rating score and financial rating score are negatively associated with pay-toperformance sensitivity.
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Hit the top and you became a target. Your board starts asking questions about comparable
compensation and folks in general just start making comments – and not of the “you’re worth
every penny” variety.
--Joan Garry, former CEO of a nonprofit organization
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Nonprofit organizations compete with other nonprofit organizations and even for-profit
organizations for talented leaders. As a result, they must offer competitive compensation packages
to attract and retain those leaders. However, nonprofit organizations with higher-paid CEOs often
become targets of controversy. Donors dislike high CEO compensation because high
compensation indicates that more of their donation is used to pay personnel instead of being used
for the organization's mission (Balsam and Harris 2014). Therefore, donors have the incentive to
monitor nonprofit organizations and CEO compensation.
However, not all donors seek IRS Form 990 information (Balsam and Harris 2014). Form
990 is the informational form filed by nonprofit organizations as required by the IRS. Form 990
includes a wide range of information about the operations of a nonprofit organization, including
financial and limited personnel information. The form is considered public information and many
organizations post the forms on their website. However, not all donors are capable of
understanding the financial information of nonprofit organizations or might not find it costeffective to do so (Balsam and Harris 2014). Therefore, even though Form 990 information is
publicly available, not all donors will seek the forms for data.
As is indicated by Balsam and Harris (2014) small donors do not generally react to the
disclosure of nonprofit organization CEO compensation. Charity rating agencies provide nonprofit
rating information based on the analysis of Form 990 and other qualitative characteristics of
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nonprofit organizations (Harris and Neely 2016; Charity Navigator 2020). The information
provided by the rating agencies are easier to access and understand for the donors, and prior
research has found evidence that donors use information issued by charity rating agencies to make
donation decisions (Sloan 2008; Gordon, Knock, and Keely 2009; Chen 2009; Grant 2010; and
Harries and Neely 2016). Therefore, it is likely that donors play a more substantial monitoring role
for rated organizations than for those organizations that are not rated. The purpose of the current
study is to understand the relationship between organization rating and CEO pay-to-performance
sensitivity.
Pay-to-performance sensitivity is used in both nonprofit and for-profit literature to indicate
monitoring characteristics. Ke, Petroni, and Safieddine (1999) study the association between
ownership concentration and pay-to-performance sensitivity and find that firm monitoring is
associated with ownership concentration. Aggarwal, Evans, and Nanda (2012) also find that
nonprofit board size impacts pay-to-performance sensitivity in nonprofit organizations. Baber,
Daniel, and Roberts (2002) provide evidence that nonprofit organization CEO compensation is
associated with performance. Specifically, an increase in CEO performance corresponds with an
increase in compensation. However, different monitoring types will impact the magnitude of the
increase in compensation following an improvement in nonprofit organization performance, (i.e.,
a change in total revenue and/or a change in the program spending ratio).
Charity rating agencies provide rating information of nonprofit organizations which allows
donors to make informed donation decisions. The rating scores are based on analyses of the
financial information of the nonprofit organization provided on Form 990 and the accountability
and transparency information of the nonprofit organizations. The roles of charity rating agencies
are similar to those of financial analysts, who act as information intermediaries between investors
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and public firms. They provide evaluation reports based on their analyses of firm financial
statements, and these evaluation reports are easier to assess than the raw data to investors. Financial
analysts play an essential role in the market because not all investors find it cost-effective to access
firms’ financial statements, nor do they all have the special knowledge to process the financial
information. Like financial analysts, charity rating agencies rely on nonprofit organizations'
financial statements on Form 990, as well as other organization information (i.e. organization
governance) to provide donors with rating information, which is easier to understand and more
accessible to the donors. Therefore, it is more cost-effective for donors to seek information from
charity rating agencies before making donating decisions.
Prior research has found evidence of donors’ use of third-party rating information (Sloan
2008; Chen 2009; and Grant 2010) and that a(n) increase (decrease) in charity rating is associated
with a(n) increase (decrease) in the amount of donations afterward (Gordon, Knock, and Neely
2009). Charity agencies also provide sorting tools ordered by rating, as well as “top” lists.
Therefore, rated organizations will have more public exposure to donors than non-rated
organizations. Given that donors dislike high CEO compensation (Balsam and Harris 2014;
Balsam and Harris 2018), organizations with increased public exposure may feel pressured to
maintain a lower level of CEO compensation. Therefore, CEO compensation is likely to be lower
in the rated organizations because of higher social pressure from public exposure, controlling for
CEO performance.
This paper's sample contains 271,068 organization years from the year 2010 to the year
2017, with 18,436 organization years as rated organization years. Results of the model show that
rated organization years have lower pay-to-performance sensitivity than non-rated organization
years. High overall and financial rating scores are also found to be negatively associated with pay71

to-performance sensitivity. These findings provide evidence that donors likely play a significant
monitoring role through rating information.
This research contributes to the existing literature on nonprofit organization monitoring in
several ways. First, this study complements the literature on charity rating and finds that charity
rating is associated with nonprofit organizations' pay-to-performance sensitivities. Specifically,
pay-to-performance sensitivity is lower for rated organizations. The results provide additional
evidence that donors use third-party information to make decisions. Second, this paper adds to the
nonprofit organization governance and monitoring literature and finds that charity rating agencies’
role as information intermediaries also contributes to the external monitoring of nonprofit
organizations. Since donors have easier access to nonprofit organization characteristics through
these agencies, monitoring is feasible for donors through the rating agencies. Aggarwal et al. (2012)
find evidence of nonprofit organizations' insider governance role, but this study complements
nonprofit organizations' monitoring by finding evidence of external monitoring on nonprofit
organizations. Third, it contributes to the nonprofit organization's executive compensation
literature and provides additional evidence that executive compensation is less sensitive to CEO
performance under public exposure.
The following section provides background and hypothesis. Section 3 explains the samples,
and Section 4 is empirical results. The last section is the conclusion.
2.0 BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS:
Agency problem exists in for-profit firms because ownership and management of the firms
are separated, and the conflict of interest may result in management behaving in a way that does
not maximize value for the owners (Jensen and Meckling 2019). Research has developed practices
to mitigate agency problems, such as tying executive pay to performance and introducing board
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and internal auditors to monitor management behavior (Mehran 1995; Klein 2002; and Bebchuk
and Fried 2003), to maximize stockholders’ welfare. Like for-profit firms, nonprofit organizations
can face serious agency problems. Donors provide funds to nonprofit organizations expecting
management to do their best to realize organization missions, while managers have the incentives
to expropriate these funds (Fama and Jensen 1983). Prior research on agency problems in the nonprofit sector focuses on the role of nonprofit boards. Studies have shown that increased board
oversight is associated with lower agency costs (Brickley, Van Horn, and Wedig 2003; Callen,
Klein, and Tinkelman 2003). Aggarwal et al. (2012) also find that board size is positively
associated with nonprofit organization performance measures. However, nonprofit boards are
often dominated by insiders, and the monitoring role of these boards is eliminated (Fama and
Jensen 1983). Also board members tend to be pushed by management to focus on fundraising
instead of monitoring activities (O’Regan and Oster 2005). Therefore, even though nonprofit
boards play a monitoring role, this role is often limited.
On the other hand, donors have substantial incentives to monitor nonprofit organizations.
Donors are fund providers, and they would like the funds to be spent to realize organization
missions. Fisman and Hubbard (2003) find that donors play an essential role in monitoring
organizations if board oversight is not stringent. Gaver and Im (2014) also provide evidence that
excess CEO compensation is negatively related to external funding, supporting the view that fund
providers' demand for monitoring is associated with agency costs in nonprofit organizations.
Despite donors’ strong incentives to monitor nonprofit organizations, their monitoring
tools are often limited. Nonprofit organizations file IRS Form 990, where they disclose balance
sheet, cash flow statements, and executives' payment statements. However, not all donors are
capable of understanding the information on the IRS forms. It is also not cost-effective for smaller
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donors to seek out financial information, and they may not even know where to find it (Tinkelman
1998; Yetman and Yetman 2013). Balsam and Harris (2014) find evidence that sophisticated
donors react to executive compensation, while small donors do not. Given that most donors are
smaller donors (Balsam and Harris 2014), donors' monitoring role is likely to be limited because
of nonprofit organization information accessibility.
The same information accessibility issue exists in the for-profit world since not all investors
could interpret financial reports. However, investors rely on financial analysts who analyze firm
financial information and issue evaluation reports. These evaluation reports are more
understandable and accessible to the investors, which allows more access to financial information
for the investors and reduces information asymmetry between firms and investors.
Like financial analysts for the for-profit world, charity rating agencies act as information
intermediaries between donors and nonprofit organizations. The rating agencies evaluate the
performance of nonprofit organizations and issue evaluation reports for the donors. Generally, the
rating agencies provide the donors with a rating score or a rating rank, or both, on the rated
organizations. The rating is based on a compounding analysis of different dimensions of nonprofit
organization characteristics. For example, the rating agency used in this study is Charity
Navigator3. Charity Navigator claims to be the largest and most used charity rating agency
(Charity Navigator 2020), and it rates about 9,000 organizations annually. Charity Navigator
evaluates nonprofit organizations on two dimensions, financial and accountability. They develop
financial ratios to evaluate financial efficiency and capacity using the financial information on

3

Following Gordon, Knock and Neely (2009), this study uses Charity Navigator as rating agency. Charity Navigator
is the only rating agency that provides historical rating records for nonprofit organizations and provide the highest
number of observations in this study. Also, Charity Navigator was listed by Badal (2007) as one of the best
information sources on charities.
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Form 990. They also assess nonprofit accountability utilizing the information from Form 990 and
the organization's websites. Once these two dimensions are assessed, Charity Navigator will
calculate an organization's overall score and issue both a rating score and a rating rank4. The
ratings reveal the nonprofit organizations' financial health and governance effectiveness to donors,
allowing donors to have indirect but easy access to nonprofit organizations' information. Therefore,
rating agencies provide a tool for donors to carry out their monitoring roles. Theoretical framework
of this study is shown in Figure 4.1.
INSERT FIGURE 4.1
Prior research has confirmed donors’ use of third-party information to make donation
decisions (Sloan 2008; Chen 2009; Grant 2010). Gordon et al. (2009) also provide evidence that a
higher rating is associated with more donations. Comparing rated or not-rated organizations, Harris
and Neely (2016) find significantly more donations to rated organizations than to not-rated
organizations. These findings suggest that rated organizations will receive more public exposure
than not-rated organizations and provide additional support to the argument that donors reach out
for third-party information about nonprofit organizations. Because of the public exposure of rated
nonprofit organizations, donors’ monitoring is likely stronger for rated organizations. Therefore,
my first hypothesis is:
H1: Controlling for nonprofit organization size, CEO compensation is lower in nonprofit
organizations that are rated by rating agencies compared to that in nonprofit organizations that are
not rated by rating agencies.

4

See https://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=content.view&cpid=5593#rating
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Baber, Daniel, and Roberts (2002) find that CEO compensation is associated with
accounting measures, namely revenues and program spending ratios5, which implies that CEO
compensation captures performance information. Therefore, CEOs who can generate more
revenues are in high demand, and organizations need to offer enough compensation to attract these
talented leaders. On the other hand, higher CEO compensation increases the scrutiny of nonprofit
organizations (Boroff 2008; Banjo 2009; Wilhelm 2009; Gershman 2011), and Balsam and Harris
(2014) find that donors react negatively to the disclosure of high executive compensation. Bonuses
are also found to be negatively associated with donations (Balsam and Harris 2018). Even though
donors dislike high executive compensations in nonprofit organizations, high CEO compensation
does not necessarily indicate agency problems unless it comes with poor performance. To rule out
the impact of management performance on CEO compensation, research on nonprofit organization
agency problems typically study pay-to-performance sensitivity and compares whether the payto-performance sensitivity is associated with any other variable that could impact nonprofit
governance monitoring. For example, Aggarwal et al. (2012) find evidence that nonprofit board
size is negatively related to pay-to-performance sensitivity for nonprofit organizations.
Specifically, for the same improvement in CEO performance, the increase in compensation will
be lower if the board size is larger. The results imply that nonprofit organization boards play a
monitoring role in organizational governance and that the larger the board's size, the stronger the
monitoring role. This study is to extend the Aggarwal et al. (2012) paper by studying the role of
external monitors of nonprofit organizations. As is discussed above, donors have the incentives to
monitor nonprofit organizations, and the charity rating agencies provide the donors with easy,
accessible, and understandable information about nonprofit organizations. This study investigates

5

Program spending ratio=Total Program Spending Expenses/Total Revenue
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whether the availability of charity rating information is associated with nonprofit organization
CEO pay-to-performance sensitivity.
Charity Navigator interprets financial information of nonprofit organizations and issues
rating scores and rating ranks. Prior research has confirmed donors’ use of rating information
(Gordon et al. 2009; Harris and Neely 2016). Therefore, the rated organizations receive more
public exposure and provide donors with useful tools to monitor nonprofit organizations. Agency
problems in these rated organizations are thus likely to be alleviated. Because donors look
unfavorably at high compensation, the pay-to-performance sensitivity will likely be lower for the
rated organizations. Therefore, my second hypothesis is:
H2: Pay-to-performance sensitivity is lower for nonprofit organizations that are rated by
charity rating agencies compared to that for nonprofit organizations that are not rated by rating
agencies.
According to Fama and Jensen (1983), monitoring in nonprofit organizations is different
from that in the for-profit world because there are no “owners” in nonprofit organizations and no
one claims the residual value of the organizations. However, donors look unfavorably at higher
CEO compensation. According to Balsam and Harris (2014), donations from donors who rely on
financial reports (sophisticate donors) are negatively associated with CEO compensation. Balsam
and Harris (2018) also find that donation is negatively associated with CEO bonus pay from the
prior period. Other research also finds that donors use third-party information to make donating
decisions (Sloan 2008; Chen 2009; and Grant 2010) and that higher ratings is associated with more
donations (Harris and Neely 2016). In an extensive search, no research was found that addressed
the monitoring role of donors This gap in nonprofit research is interesting because even though
donors contribute to nonprofit organizations, they are not owners, nor do they generally have a
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specific impact on the operations. Despite the limitations of the donors’ direct monitoring role in
the nonprofit organizations, public exposure can pressure the CEOs to do what is right instead of
seeking personal benefits. Moreover, donors also have the incentives to monitor the activities of
the organizations' management to confirm that their donations are used to contribute to the program
mission and they do not like any inappropriate financial compensations (Fisman and Hubbard
2003). Therefore, high ratings are likely to be associated with higher public exposure, and both
reduced information asymmetry and increased public exposure can alleviate agency problems and
lead to lower CEO compensation.
As is discussed above, donors dislike higher compensation, so organizations with high
public exposure have the incentives not to compensate their CEOs with high salaries. Moreover,
Preston (1989) finds that there is a wage difference between the workers in the for-profit
organizations and those in the nonprofit organizations and that most of the difference exists
because the nonprofit workers engage in “labor donations.” Also, Carpenter and Myers (2007) find
that altruism and reputational concerns are positively associated with the decision to volunteer.
Therefore, it is likely that the nonprofit CEOs choose to work in a nonprofit organization instead
of a commercial firm because of reputation concerns. If the rating agency lists the nonprofit
organization, the organization will have more public exposure. Therefore, the CEOs of the
organization are more likely to have lower pay because of reputation concerns. My third hypothesis
is:
H3: Nonprofit rating score is negatively associated with CEO pay-to-performance
sensitivity.
As is mentioned above, Charity Navigator also provides two dimensions of ratings,
financial and accountability. The financial rating measures financial efficiency and capacity using
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Charity Navigator's financial ratios, and accountability evaluates charity accountability and
transparency.6 It might be the case that if directors of an organization have excellent performance
financially, their intelligence and leadership skills can improve accountability as well. However,
these two dimensions are not directly related to each other. Financial ratios are derived from the
financial statements on Form 990, while accountability evaluates organization governance, and the
information for accountability rating is from the answers to qualitative questions on Form 990 or
organization websites. Even though the overall hypothesis is that higher ratings are associated with
CEO compensation, it is of interest to test whether financial and accountability ratings have
different impacts on CEO compensation. Compared to accountability measures, which are
qualitative measures that are easily available on organization websites, financial measures require
professional evaluations beyond most donors. It is not cost-effective for most donors to evaluate
on their own, and that most donors might not be capable of doing so. Therefore, financial measures
are expected to play a more important role in reducing information asymmetry between nonprofit
organizations and donors, and accountability measures might not play a role that is as important
as financial measures. Therefore. my last two hypotheses, stated in the null form, are:
H4: Financial rating score/rank is negatively associated with CEO pay-to-performance
sensitivity.
H5: Accountability rating score/rank is negatively associated with CEO pay-toperformance sensitivity.

6

See https://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=content.view&cpid=35 for financial rating and
https://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=content.view&cpid=1093 for accountability rating
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3.0 SAMPLE AND MODELS:
3.1 Sample
The compensation and fundamental data in this study are obtained from a database of efiled, IRS Form 990 returns from the years 2010 to 2017. The database was derived from the IRS
cloud-based data warehouse of e-filed returns, stored on Amazon Web Services (Wu and Dull
2020). The IRS requires that nonprofit organizations disclose the compensation information for
their officers, directors, trustees, key employees, highly compensated employees, and independent
contractors in Part VII of Form 990. Therefore, the compensation information is obtained from
Part VII of Form 990. The compensation data used in this paper include the compensation for all
the individuals if their titles in the organizations contain "CEO," "Chief Executive Officer,"
"Director," or "President." Fundamental data needed for the study include total assets, total revenue,
total program service expenses, and total CEO compensation, all from Form 990. The Form 990
database includes Form 990 information for the organizations that electronically filed only.
Nonprofit organizations are classified by sector through the National Taxonomy of Exempt
Entities (NTEE), and each organization is assigned to one of 26 sectors.
Following Gordon et al. (2009), this paper uses Charity Navigator as a rating agency
because it is the only agency that provides historical rating records thereby enabling this study to
include prior years in the analysis, and providing the largest possible sample size. Charity
Navigator claims to be the largest and most used charity rating agency (Charity Navigator 2020)
and rates about 9,000 nonprofit organizations annually. Charity Navigator evaluates nonprofit
organizations based on two dimensions. the financial dimension assesses the financial health of
the organization while the accountability dimension assesses the governance and ethics of the
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organization.7 For each dimension, Charity Navigator provides both a score (from 0-100) and
rating rank (0-4 stars). The ranks correspond with the value of scores (see Figure 4.2). After the
financial and accountability scores are determined, Charity Navigator uses a formula that includes
the scores for the two dimensions to provides an overall score. Gordon et al. (2009), Harris and
Neely (2016), nor any other prior study utilizes historical rating data from Charity Navigator. This
paper, however, extracts historical rating information for the years 2010 to 2019 from the APIs
provided by Charity Navigator using Python. The detailed data extracting procedure is illustrated
in Appendix A.
INSERT FIGURE 4.2
Form 990 fundamental data were merged with the rating data from Charity Navigator by
year and Employer Identification Number (EIN). A sample of 275,516 organization years from
51,441 organizations is obtained, including 18,436 rated organization years from 4,419
organizations.
3.2 The models
To examine the monitoring role of donors through charity rating agencies, it is of interest
to test whether rated nonprofit organizations have lower CEO compensation than nonprofit
organizations that are not rated by rating agencies (H1). To mitigate size effects on CEO
compensation, the model includes CEO compensation adjusted by total revenues as the dependent
variable. The model also includes total assets adjusted by total revenues and total program
spending as control variables. Nonprofit organization size is likely associated with compensation
because higher larger nonprofit organizations can afford higher payments to their CEOs. Therefore,
Model (1) in this study is as follows:

7

See footnote 3.
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COMP/REVit = β0 + β1RATEDit + β2Asset/Rev + β3Pspending + β4Sector Dummy +
β5Year dummy + µt + τi + ξit
(1)
Where:
COMP/REV
RATED

=
=

Asset/Rev
Pspending/Rev

=
=

CEO compensation adjusted by total revenue in year t;
A dummy variable that indicates whether the organization
year is rated by Charity navigator, and RATED = 1 if the
organization year is rated, and 0 otherwise;
Total assets adjusted by total revenue; and
Total program spending in year t adjusted by total revenue.

Prior literature uses pay-to-performance sensitivity to indicate monitoring of the
organizations (Ke et al. 1999; and Aggarwal et al. 2002). Therefore, the second model includes
the interaction terms between charity rating dummy variable and performance variables. Since
Aggarwal et al. (2002) find evidence that nonprofit organization board size has a negative impact
on pay-to-performance sensitivity, this model includes board size and the interaction terms
between board size and performance measures to avoid omitted variable bias. The same variable
and interaction terms are included in the models to test other hypotheses that test pay-toperformance sensitivity. To examine the impact of rating agencies on pay-to-performance
sensitivity for nonprofit organizations (H2), Model (2) in this study is as follows:
%ΔCOMPit = β0 + β1%ΔREVit + β2ΔYIELDit + β3RATEDit + β4BOARDit
+ β4(%ΔREVit × RATEDit) + β5(ΔYIELDit × RATEDit)
+ β6(%ΔREVit × BOARDit) + β7(ΔYIELDit × BOARDit) + β8 Ln(ASSETS)it-1
+ β9 (%ΔREVit × Ln(ASSETS)it-1 + β10 (ΔYIELDit × ln(ASSETS)it-1
+ β11Sector Dummy + β12Year dummy
+ µt + τi + ξit
(2)
Where:
%ΔCOMP

=

%ΔREV
BOARD

=
=

Percentage change in CEO compensation from year t - 1 to
year t;
Percentage change in total revenue from year t - 1 to year t;
Board size of the organization year;
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RATED

=

ΔYIELD
Ln(ASSETS)

=
=

A dummy variable that indicates whether the organization
year is rated by Charity navigator, and RATED = 1 if the
organization year is rated, and 0 otherwise;
Fund usage performance; and
Natural log of total assets.

Nonprofit organization CEO performance measures are %ΔREV and ΔYIELD, derived by
Baber et al. (2002). Baber et al. (2002) argue that charities are brokers of funds from donors to
beneficiaries, and the objective is to maximize program spending on program activities. Baber et
al. (2002) then decompose percentage change in program spending as:
%ΔPSPENDING = %ΔREV + ΔYIELD

(3)

In Model (3) %ΔPSPENDING is the percentage change in total program spending, %ΔREV
is the percentage change in total revenue, and ΔYIELDt = [REVt × ΔRATIOt]/PSPENDINGt-1. In
the two portions of program spending change, %ΔREV indicates the change in fundraising
performance, and ΔYIELD indicates the change in brokering's average cost contributed capital
from contributors to beneficiaries. Baber et al. (2002) find that these two performance measures
are positively associated with compensation.
Following Aggarwal et al. (2012), this model includes the interaction terms between
performance measure and the primary variable of interest in this study, namely RATED. The
coefficients of the interaction terms β4 and β5 are expected to be negative. If this is the case, it
implies that the percentage increase in CEO compensation will be less for the rated organizations
for the same improvement in performance. The model also includes the interaction terms between
Ln(ASSETS) and performance measures to control any non-linear size effect between payperformance sensitivity and nonprofit size, following Aggarwal et al. (2012). Sector and year fixed
effects are included in the model as µt and τi.
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Charity Navigator does not include CEO compensation as a rating standard. Even though
failure to provide CEO compensation will hurt the charity’s accountability and transparency score,
the compensation amount does not impact a charity’s financial rating. Thus, including charity
rating as an independent variable and compensation as a dependent variable should not result in
an endogeneity issue.
H3 examines if the nonprofit rating score has a negative impact on CEO pay-toperformance sensitivity. Sloan (2008), Chen (2009), and Grant (2010) find evidence that donors
use third-party information to make donation decisions. Moreover, Gordon et al. (2009) find that
an increase in charity rating is associated with increased donations, and Harris and Neely (2016)
find that higher ratings are associated with more donations. Even though donors’ direct monitoring
role is limited, public exposure will push the CEOs of nonprofit organizations to do what is right
instead of seeking personal benefits.
Therefore, it is likely that higher ratings cause more public exposure for nonprofit
organizations. To test H3, this study used Model (4) as follows:
%ΔCOMPit = β0 + β1%ΔREVit + β2ΔYIELDit + β3lnSCOREit + β4BOARDit
+ β5(%ΔREVit × BOARDit) + β6(ΔYIELDit × BOARDit)
+ β7(%ΔREVit × LnSCOREit) + β8(ΔYIELDit × LnSCOREit)
+ β9 Ln(ASSETS)it-1 + β10 (%ΔREVit × Ln(ASSETS)it-1
+ β11 (ΔYIELDit × Ln(ASSETS)it-1 + β12Sector Dummy + β13Year dummy
+ µt + τi + ξit
(4)
Where:
%ΔCOMP

=

%ΔREV
ΔYIELD
BOARD
LnSCORE
Ln(ASSETS)

=
=
=
=
=

Percentage change in CEO compensation from year t - 1 to
year t;
Percentage change in total revenue from year t - 1 to year t;
Fund usage performance; and
Board size of the organization year;
Rating score by Charity Navigator;
Natural log of total assets.
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Charity Navigator provides two dimensions of ratings, financial and accountability. While
accountability captures qualitative measures that are easily available on organization websites,
financial measures require professional evaluations beyond most donors. It is also not costefficient for most donors to reach out to the tax forms of nonprofit organizations. Therefore,
financial ratings are likely to play a more important role in reducing information asymmetry
between nonprofit organizations and donors as compared to accountability ratings. The model to
test H4 and H5 is similar to the test for H3, and both financial and accountability ratings are
included. Model (5) to test H4 and H5 is as follows:
%ΔCOMPit = β0 + β1%ΔREVit + β2ΔYIELDit + β3LnFinit + β4LnAccit + β5BOARDit
+ β6(%ΔREVit × BOARDit) + β7(ΔYIELDit × BOARDit)
+ β8(%ΔREVit × LnFinit)+ β9(ΔYIELDit × LnFinit) + β10(%ΔREVit ×LnAccit)
+ β11(ΔYIELDit × LnAccit)+ β12 ln(ASSETS)it-1
+β13 (%ΔREVit × Ln(ASSETS)it-1 + β14 (ΔYIELDit × Ln(ASSETS)it-1
+ β15Sector Dummy + β16Year dummy
+ µt + τi + ξit
(5)
Where:
%ΔCOMP

=

%ΔREV

=

Percentage change in CEO compensation from year t - 1 to
year t;
Percentage change in total revenue from year t - 1 to year t;

ΔYIELD
BOARD

=
=

Fund usage performance; and
Board size of the organization year;

LnFin
LnAcc

=
=

Natural log of financial rating score by Charity Navigator;
Natural log of accountability rating score by Charity
Navigator;

Ln(ASSETS)

=

Natural log of total assets.
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4.0 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 4.1. The descriptive statistics for levels variables
and change variables are presented in Panel A and Panel B, respectively. Panel A shows that there
are 275,516 organization years included in the sample of this study. This sample is used to test H1
and H2, which involves the study on all nonprofit organizations with available data. However, the
sample is reduced to only including rated organizations to test H3, H4, and H5. The rated sample
includes 28,210 observations. Table 4.1 reports the descriptive statistics based on the overall
sample. The average CEO compensation in this sample is $162,492, with a median of 104,434.
The average total revenue of nonprofit organizations in this sample is about $75 million, and the
average program spending is about $59 million. The average size of nonprofit organizations,
measured by total assets is about $111 million, with a min of $22,000 and a max of $2,952 million.
The descriptive statistics for the change variables are shown in Panel B of Table 4.1.
Percentage change in CEO compensation is 10.7% on average, with a median of 2.7%. The
mean %ΔREV is 8.20%, and the median is 3.9%. ΔYIELD shows similar statistics to that
of %ΔREV, with a mean of -1.20% and a median of 0.00%. %ΔPSPENDING has a mean of 7%
and a median of 3.90%.
INSERT TABLE 4.1
Table 4.2 reports correlation coefficients between the variables of interest. Panel A presents
the correlation coefficients between levels variables, and Panel B shows those between change
variables. The compensation level variable is positively associated with total assets, total revenue,
and total program spending. This is as expected because larger organizations (higher total assets)
are expected to have more revenues and program spending. Also, Charity Navigator only provides
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ratings for larger organizations, so rated organizations should have higher compensations. This
does not contradict with H1 since H1 will be tested using a regression model with control variables
that might impact compensation as well. Detailed information will be given below in the regression
result session. Panel B of Table 4.2 shows the correlation coefficients of the change variables.
Change in compensation is positively associated with a change in CEO performance. This is
consistent with the results in Baber et al. (2002).
INSERT TABLE 4.2
4.2 Regression results
H1 tests whether rated nonprofit organizations have higher compensation than non-rated
organizations. To further facilitate the test, Figure 4.3 shows a trend of average CEO compensation
for rated and non-rated organizations through the sample period. Figure 4.3 shows that even though
CEO compensation adjusted by total revenues shows increasing trends for both rated and nonrated organizations, CEO compensation adjusted by total revenue has been higher for the nonprofit
organizations that are not rated than that for the rated organizations, and the difference is more
significant over time. This provides evidence that rated nonprofit organizations are likely under
more monitoring than non-rated organizations, and the monitoring is likely from donors through
nonprofit rating agencies.
Table 4.3 shows the regression results for Model (1) to test H1. Compensation adjusted by
total revenue is the dependent variable. The main variable of interest is an indicator variable Rated,
which equals 1 if the organization year has a rating record on Charity Navigator and 0 otherwise.
Control variables include total assets adjusted by total revenue and total program spending. The
coefficient on Rated is negative and significant (-52.254) at the 1 percent level (t statistics=32.947). This supports H1 that rated charities pay less in CEO compensation. Since donors dislike
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higher CEO compensation (Balsam and Harris 2014). This result likely indicates that donors play
a monitoring role through rating agencies to lower CEO compensation.
INSERT FIGURE 4.3
INSERT TABLE 4.3
H2 in this study focuses on whether a rated charity is negatively associated with nonprofit
organization pay-to-performance sensitivity. The dependent variable of this model is the
percentage change in CEO compensation. Table 4.4 presents the regression results for Model (2).
For H2, the variables of interest are the interaction terms between the charity rating dummy
variable and the two performance measures. The coefficient for the interaction between rating
dummy and change in revenues (yield) is -0.127 (-0.099), with a t-statistics of -3.100 (-2.863).
This suggests that pay-to-performance sensitivity is lower for rated nonprofit organizations. While
Baber et al. (2002) find evidence that CEO performance is associated with CEO compensation,
the magnitude of the increase in CEO compensation with the same level of increase in performance
indicates the effectiveness of the monitoring roles of other parties, and lower pay-to-performance
sensitivity implies more effective monitoring of the organization. Research on both for-profit and
nonprofit organizations have applied this concept to test monitoring role (Ke et al. 1999; Aggarwal
et al. 2012). Therefore, lower pay-to-performance sensitivity for the rated nonprofit organizations
suggests that monitoring for rated organizations is likely stronger, and this monitoring is likely
from donors since they have the incentive to do so and rating agencies provide them with the
channel to play this role.
INSERT TABLE 4.4
As is discussed above, nonprofit organizations with higher rating scores are likely to have
more public exposure. Charity Navigator provides a sorted list of nonprofit organizations, and it
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is rational to assume that donors are more likely to search nonprofit organizations with higher
ratings. In fact, prior research has found that a higher rating is associated with more donations, and
an increase in rating score is followed by more donations (Gordon et al. 2009; Harris and Neely
2016). To test whether a charity rating score is associated with pay-to-performance sensitivity (H3),
the rating dummy variable is replaced with the natural log of the actual rating score to obtain
Model (4). Table 4.5 presents the regression results of this analysis. The interaction term's
coefficient between the natural log of rating score and percentage change in revenues is -0.840
with a t-statistics of -2.752. The interaction term's coefficient between the natural log of rating
score and change in yield is -0.576, with a t-statistics of -1.887 and marginally significant at the
10 percent level. Therefore, H3 is supported. As is explained above, lower pay-to-performance
sensitivity implies more effective monitoring. Therefore, the negative coefficient of the interaction
term between rating scores and performance measures indicates that highly-rated organizations are
under more effective monitoring, and the monitoring is likely from donors since highly-rated
organizations have more public exposure and their information is more accessible to donors.
INSERT TABLE 4.5
H4 tests whether financial rating reduces information asymmetry between donors and
nonprofit organizations, while H5 tests the effect of accountability rating information. The
financial rating evaluates nonprofit organizations' financial performance based on the financial
information on Form 990, while the accountability rating evaluates some qualitative characteristics
of nonprofit organizations such as organization government. Accountability measures are
evaluated based on the information from the website, so accountability information is likely more
accessible for donors. On the other hand, not all donors are able to interpret the information from
Form 990 (Balsam and Harris 2014). Model (5) includes interaction terms between the two rating
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scores (financial and accountability) and the two performance measures (revenue and yield). The
coefficient of the interaction term between the natural log of financial (accountability) rating score
and change in revenue is -0.482 (-0.418), with t-statistics of -2.528 (-1.282). The coefficient of the
interaction terms between the natural log of financial (accountability) rating score and change in
yield is -0.567 (0.227), with t-statistics of –2.790 (-0.687). Overall, the interaction terms'
coefficients between the natural log of financial rating scores and performance measures are
significant, while those for the interactions between accountability scores and performance
measures are not significant. Thus, H4 is supported and H5 is rejected. Since accountability
information is more accessible and understandable by donors (i.e. board listing, Form 990
availability, or privacy policy), it is likely that donors do not need rating information to monitor
nonprofit organizations. On the other hand, the financial rating is based on ratio analysis on the
financial reports, which requires professional techniques. Therefore, it is more likely that donors
rely on charity ratings to monitor. Results from this model indicate that financial rating score
affects pay-to-performance sensitivity, while accountability rating score does not have the effect,
thus providing evidence that donors use charity rating information to play the monitoring role.
INSERT TABLE 4.6
Additional analysis:
To further examine the impact of charity rating on pay-to-performance sensitivity, this
study includes an additional analysis that explores whether pay-to-performance sensitivity is
different for the same organization before and after the organization is rated by Charity Navigator.
To construct the sample, the first step is to identify organizations with at least one year of rating
by Charity Navigator. The compensation and fundamental data of all organization years available
from the Form 990 database are then matched to the organization identified in the first step.
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Another variable Ratedyr is created equal to 1 if the organization year has a rating record with
Charity Navigator and 0 otherwise. The model for this additional analysis is the same as Model
(2), except that RATED is replaced with RATEDYR, and the sample of the additional analysis
includes the organization with at least one rating record with Charity Navigator. Model (6) is as
follows:
%ΔCOMPit = β0 + β1%ΔREVit + β2ΔYIELDit + β3RATEDYRit + β4BOARDit
+ β4(%ΔREVit × RATEDYRit) + β5(ΔYIELDit × RATEDYRit)
+ β6(%ΔREVit × BOARDit) + β7(ΔYIELDit × BOARDit) + β8 Ln(ASSETS)it-1
+ β9 (%ΔREVit × Ln(ASSETS)it-1 + β10 (ΔYIELDit × ln(ASSETS)it-1
+ β11Sector Dummy + β12Year dummy
+ µt + τi + ξit
(6)
Where:
%ΔCOMP

=

%ΔREV
BOARD
RATEDYR

=
=
=

ΔYIELD
Ln(ASSETS)

=
=

Percentage change in CEO compensation from year t - 1 to
year t;
Percentage change in total revenue from year t - 1 to year t;
Board size of the organization year;
A dummy variable that indicates whether the organization
year is rated by Charity navigator, and RATEDYR = 1 if the
organization year is rated, and 0 otherwise;
Fund usage performance; and
Natural log of total assets.

Additional analysis results are presented in Table 4.7. The coefficients for the interaction
terms between RATEDYR and performance measures are negative and significant at 5 percent level.
This suggests that for the same organizations that have both rated and non-rated records, the rated
organization years have lower pay-to-performance sensitivity. In other words, a performance
improvement is associated with a lower increase in payment if the organization year is rated.
Therefore, results from this model provide additional evidence that charity rating likely plays an
important role as the media for donors to monitor nonprofit organizations.
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INSERT TABLE 4.7

5.0 DISCUSSION
This study investigates the association between charity rating and nonprofit pay-toperformance sensitivity. Because donors have incentives to monitor nonprofit organizations and
charity rating agencies reduce information asymmetry between donors and nonprofit organizations,
the association between charity rating and pay-to-performance sensitivity likely indicates external
monitoring on nonprofit organizations by donors through charity rating agencies. To facilitate this
study, the first hypothesis of this paper is to test whether rated organizations have lower CEO
compensations (adjusted by total revenue) overall. Regression results show that the coefficient of
Rated is negative, which implies that rated organizations have lower CEO compensation (adjusted
by total revenue) overall. This provides initial evidence that charity rating is likely associated with
the monitoring of nonprofit organizations.
The main test in this study is the second hypothesis, which examines whether rated
organizations have a lower pay-to-performance sensitivity. The empirical result sees negative
coefficients for the interactions between performance measures and the rating indicator. This
suggests that for a rated organization, the magnitude of the increase in CEO compensation is lower
as compared to that of a non-rated organization. Donors dislike higher payments, and this lower
increase in payments likely indicates donors monitoring role on nonprofit organizations. The
results of this test complement prior research by providing evidence of external monitoring by
donors.
Higher-rated organizations likely have more public exposure because of the easy access to
their information if donors sort or check the “top” lists. Therefore, if higher-rated organizations
have lower pay-to-performance sensitivity, it will provide further evidence of donors’ monitoring
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of nonprofit organizations. The coefficient of the interaction terms between performance measures
and rating score is significantly negative, which implies that an increase in CEO performance is
associated with an increase in CEO compensation to a lesser extent for higher-rated organizations,
compared to lower-rated organizations. Therefore, the results from this model support the
argument that donors likely monitor nonprofit organizations through the use of charity rating
information.
Charity Navigator provides charity ratings in two dimensions, financial and accountability.
Since accountability information is more accessible and understandable for donors. Financial
rating scores likely affect monitoring, while accountability not. Therefore, the next hypothesis tests
whether financial rating scores are associated with pay-to-performance sensitivity. Empirical
results show negative coefficients for the interaction terms between financial scores and
performance measures, thus providing additional evidence of donors’ use of rating information to
monitor nonprofit organizations.
To provide further evidence of donors’ monitoring role on nonprofit organizations through
charity rating agencies, this study includes an additional analysis, which examines whether payto-performance sensitivity is lower for rated organization years compared to that for non-rated
organization years for the organizations that have at least one of rating record with Charity
Navigator. Results show negative coefficients for the interaction terms between rated-year
indicator and performance measures. This adds to the evidence of donors’ use of rating information
and monitoring role through the rating agencies.

6.0 CONCLUSION
The purpose of this study is to examine whether donors play a monitoring role to nonprofit
organizations through charity rating agencies. To study this monitoring role, this study uses pay93

to-performance sensitivity to indicate monitoring effectiveness. This proxy has been used in
studies in both for-profit and nonprofit organizations (Ke et al. 1999; Aggarwal et al. 2012). Baber
et al. (2002) find a positive association between nonprofit organization CEO performance and
compensation. However, the magnitude of the increase in CEO compensation following an
improvement of performance indicates the differences in monitoring effectiveness. Donors dislike
higher CEO payments (Balsam and Harris 2014; Balsam and Harris 2018). Therefore, a lower payto-performance sensitivity is expected under donors’ scrutiny. Aggarwal et al. (2012) find lower
pay-to-performance sensitivity for nonprofit organizations with a larger board, which provides
evidence of nonprofit board’s monitoring. This paper, however, focuses on the external monitoring
role by donors.
Empirically, this study examines whether pay-to-performance sensitivity is lower for rated
organizations compared to non-rated organizations, and lower for higher-rated organizations
compared to lower-rated organizations. Rating agencies reduce information asymmetry between
donors and nonprofit organizations by providing ratings based on the analysis of financial and
accountability attributes of nonprofit organizations. Since accountability information is more
accessible to donors compared to financial information, accountability rating is not expected to
affect pay-to-performance sensitivity as financial rating does.
The sample of this study is from Form 990 of nonprofit organizations and Charity
Navigator. Using models developed based on those in Baber et al. (2002) and Aggarwal et al.
(2012), this study finds that pay-to-performance sensitivity is lower for rated organizations, highly
rated organizations, and organizations with higher financial rating.
This paper contributes to the accounting literature in the following ways. First, this study
provides evidence that charity rating is associated with the monitoring of nonprofit organizations.
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Since donors have incentives to monitor nonprofit organizations, and donors use rating information
to make decisions, donors likely play a monitoring role through charity rating agencies. Aggarwal
et al. (2012) find evidence of nonprofit organizations' insider governance role, but this study
complements nonprofit organizations' monitoring by finding evidence of external monitoring on
nonprofit organizations. Second, this study complements the literature on charity rating and finds
that charity rating is associated with nonprofit organizations' pay-to-performance sensitivities. The
results provide additional evidence that donors use third-party information to make decisions. Last,
this paper adds to the nonprofit organization governance and monitoring literature and finds that
charity rating agencies’ role as information intermediaries also contributes to the external
monitoring of nonprofit organizations.
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Appendix -How to obtain historical ratings data from Charity Navigator API
The current ratings information is readily available by Charity Navigator, but the historical
data is only available through Charity Navigator’s API. The API is provided in an interactive
window, as is shown in the picture below.

The URL is generated from the Charity Navigator API, Once the URLs are put in the internet
browser, a .json file is generated and can be copied and saved as a .txt file. 8,960 URLs were
generated through EIN (Employer Identification Number) for historical rating scores and ranks.
These ratings are for the overall rating only. For each rating record (a combination of EIN and
rating data), a unique Rating ID provided. The Charity Navigator API requires both the Rating ID
and the EIN to generate the URLs for the two dimensions of rating (financial and accountability).
107,000 combinations are generated for the two dimensions and obtained about 7,300 records.
Python codes were developed to open up the URLs and extract data from the .json files, because
of the high number of URLs and the irregular format of the .json file. The Charity Navigator API
has a limit of 25,000 hits per day, so the extraction of the data takes about five days, consistently
running the Python codes. The Python codes then generate an excel file with the overall as well as
financial and accountability rating scores and ranks.
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Figure 4.3 Trend of CEO compensation (CEO compensation adjusted by total revenue)
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Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Panel A

n

mean

SD

p25

Median

p75

COMP

275,516

162,492

188,629

65,000

104,434

177,337

ASSETS (in 1000’s)

275,516

111,805

411,227

751

3,777

22,554

PSPENDING (in
1000’s)

275,515

59,345

249,098

611

2,467

14,207

REV (in 1000’s)

275,516

74,634

315,454

813

3,206

17,810

LnScore

29,955

4.466

0.08

4.42

4.479

4.529

LnFin

29,452

4.442

0.106

4.377

4.458

4.527

LnAcc

29,491

4.522

0.088

4.489

4.533

4.605

%ΔCOMP

275,516

10.70%

44.90%

0.00%

2.70%

8.90%

%ΔREV

275,489

8.20%

32.60%

-4.70%

3.90%

14.00%

ΔYIELD

263,183

-1.20%

30.80%

-7.10%

0.00%

7.20%

%ΔPSPENDING

263,183

7.00%

24.10%

-2.80%

3.90%

12.00%

Levels
Variables

Panel B
Changes
Variables
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Table 4.2 Correlation Coefficient
Panel A
Levels
Variables

COMP

ASSET

REV

PSPENDING

COMP

1.000

ASSET

0.640***

1.000

REV

0.579***

0.842***

1.000

PSPENDING

0.581***

0.835***

0.993***

1.000

RATED

0.035***

0.014***

-0.028***

-0.031***

RATED

1.000

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Panel B
Changes
Variables

%ΔCOMP

%ΔPSPENDING

%ΔREV

ΔYIELD

ASSET

RATED

%ΔCOMP

1.000

%ΔPSPENDING

0.075***

1.000

%ΔREV

0.045***

0.418***

1.000

ΔYIELD

0.013***

0.342***

-0.678***

1.000

ASSET

-0.008***

-0.015***

0.011***

-0.023***

1.000

RATED

0.004*

-0.026***

-0.005*

-0.015***

0.198***

1.000

BOARD

0.003

-0.044***

-0.019***

-0.014***

0.617***

0.316***

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

104

BOARD

1.000

Table 4.3 Regression results for H1

VARIABLES

Comp/Rev

Rated

-52.662***
(-33.147)

2.731***

Asset/Rev

(5.430)

9.850***

Pspending/Rev

(5.57)

75.105***

Intercept

-43.61
274,781

Observations
Adjusted R-squared

0.138

Sector FE

YES

Year FE

YES

Standard errors are clustered at organization level.
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Table 4.4 Regression results for H2
VARIABLES

%Comp

Rated

0.005
(-0.221)

%REV

0.517***
(-10.188)

ΔYield

0.427***
(-10.581)

Lnasset

-0.004***
(-3.461)

Board size

0.014**
(-2.346)

Rated*%Rev

-0.127***
(-3.100)

Rated*ΔYield

-0.099***
(-2.863)

Rated*Lnasset

0.001
(-0.399)

Board*%Rev

-0.141***
(-7.414)

Board*ΔYield

-0.117***
(-7.789)

Intercept

0.099***
(-6.626)

Observations

263,183

Adjusted R-squared

0.013

Sector FE

YES

Year FE

YES

Standard errors are clustered at organization level.
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Table 4.5 Regression results for H3
VARIABLES

%Comp

%REV

4.352***
-3.144

ΔYield

3.131**
-2.386

Lnasset

-0.085
(-0.578)

Board size

0.033**
-2.526

Board*%Rev

-0.202***
(-2.655)

Board*ΔYield

-0.185**
(-2.498)

LnScore

-0.167
(-0.615)

LnScore*%Rev

-0.840***
(-2.752)

Lnscore*ΔYield

-0.576*
(-1.887)

Lnscore*Lnasset

0.018
-0.537

Intercept

0.782
-0.643

Observations

28,210

Adjusted R-squared

0.021

Sector FE

YES

Year FE

YES

Standard errors are clustered at organization level.
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Table 4.6 Regression results for H4 and H5
VARIABLES

%Comp

%REV

4.628***
(-2.634)

ΔYield

2.073
(-1.247)

Lnasset

0.107
(-0.554)

Board size

0.032**
(-2.393)

Board*%Rev

-0.202***
(-2.660)

Board*ΔYield

-0.190***
(-2.813)

LnFin

-0.326
(-1.598)

LnAcc

0.535*
(-1.82)

LnFin*%Rev

-0.482**
(-2.528)

LnFin*ΔYield

-0.567***
(-2.790)

LnFin*Lnasset

0.035
(-1.511)

LnAcc*%Rev

-0.418
(-1.282)

LnAcc*ΔYield

0.227
(-0.687)
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LnAcc*Lnasset

-0.059*
(-1.648)

Intercept

-0.934
(-0.614)

Observations

27,734

Adjusted R-squared

0.023

Sector FE

YES

Year FE

YES

Standard errors are clustered at organization level.
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Table 4.7 Regression results for additional analysis
VARIABLES

%Comp

Ratedyr

0.027
(0.444)

%REV

0.682***
(2.799)

ΔYield

0.604***
(2.719)

Lnasset

-0.004
(-0.614)

Board size

0.027**
(2.315)

Ratedyr*%REV

-0.145**
(-2.013)

Ratedyr* ΔYield

-0.139**
(-1.966)

Rratedyr*Lnasset

-0.001
(-0.187)

%REV*Board

-0.182**
(-2.472)

ΔYield *Board

-0.156**
(-2.257)

Intercept

0.036
(0.601)

Observations

32,903

Adjusted R-squared

0.016

Sector FE

YES

Year FE

YES

Standard errors are clustered at organization level.
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